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The Pure Death Benefit: An Estate and Gift
Tax Anomaly
Bruce Wolk*
I INTRODUCTION
Congress has intentionally exempted employee death ben-
efits payable under qualified retirement plans from the federal
estatel and gift2 taxes.3 In addition, a narrow but significant
class of unqualified death benefits has also managed to escape
taxation. The benefits in question are pure death benefits over
which the employee has no power to change the designated
beneficiary. A death benefit is pure4 if it provides no payments
during the employee's life.5 Although the Internal Revenue
* Associate Dean, University of California, Davis School of Law.
1. I.C. § 2039(c). The exclusion applies only if the benefits are payable
to beneficiaries other than the employee's estate, and other than in a lump
sum. Even lump sum payments may qualify if the recipient irrevocably elects
not to make use of the extremely favorable ten-year averaging of lump sum
payments for income tax purposes. IR.C. § 2039(f). The exclusion does not ap-
ply to the extent the benefits are attributable to employee contributions.
The types of benefits which qualify for exclusion are set forth in
paragraphs (1)-(4) of § 2039(c). These include the typical pension and profit
sharing plans which meet the requirements of LR.C. § 401 and thereby receive
highly favorable income tax treatment.
2. LR.C. § 2517.
3. This exclusion has been frequently criticized and its wisdom is debata-
ble. See, e.g., ALI FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFt TAXATION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTERS' STUDIES 15-16 (1969); S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H.
GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 470-71 (3d ed. 1977); Bittker, Es-
tate and Gift Taxation Under the 1954 Code: The Principal Changes, 29 Tul.. L
REV. 453, 470-71 (1955); Kramer, Employee Benefits and Federal Estate and Gift
Taxes, 1959 DuKE L.J. 341, 394-96; Note, Employee Death Benefits, 26 TAx. L.
REv. 329, 353-54 (1971).
The Treasury Department recommended repeal of LR.C. §§ 2039(c) and
2517 as part of its general reform proposals for a unified transfer tax in 1969.
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., UNITED STATES
TEASURY DEPARTMENT TAX REFORM STUDIEs AND PROPOSALS 363-64 (Comm.
Print 1969).
4. At least one author has instead used the term "naked." See Crown, Na-
ked Death Benefits-An Estate Planning Opportunity?, 4 NOTRE DAME EST.
PLAN. INST. 37 (1980).
5. A typical benefit provides that upon the death of the employee a speci-
fied sum, frequently linked to the employee's salary, is to be paid to a named
beneficiary, often the employee's spouse. The payment might be in a lump sum
or payable over some period of time.
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Service has sought to fit the pure death benefit under almost
every section of the Internal Revenue Code6 defining the gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes, these attempts have met
with only limited success. The exclusion of pure death benefits
from the employee's estate opens a significant loophole in the
Code's transfer tax provisions. The Service has recently at-
tempted to reach these benefits under the gift tax.7 These ef-
forts, although ingenious, remain stopgap measures. A
comprehensive rethinking of the treatment of employee death
benefits is clearly in order.
This Article initially discusses the attempts to apply the
Code's estate tax sections to the pure death benefit, concluding
that section 20388 can be interpreted to reach such benefits and
that judicial decisions to the contrary are incorrect. Because
the courts are reluctant to construe section 2038 to reach pure
death benefits, the Article examines the various ways in which
these benefits could be taxed as gifts. The Article notes that a
number of courts have strongly hinted at the possible applica-
bility of the gift tax.9 In addition, a recent rulingO by the Serv-
ice provides for the taxation of such benefits as gifts. The
Article asserts, however, that this ruling is an inappropriate ap-
plication of the gift tax. The Article concludes that, in the ab-
sence of an appropriate response by the Service or the
judiciary, statutory changes may be necessary. Congress
should amend section 2039" of the Code to remove the retained
interest requirement, thereby bringing pure death benefits
within the employee's gross estate.
II. ESTATE TAX ASPECTS
A. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF SECTION 2039
The death benefit must be pure--contain no lifetime bene-
fit-if it is to escape estate taxation under section 2039(a).12
6. Hereinafter referred to in the text as "the Code" or by section number
only.
7. Rev. RuL 81-31, 1981-4 I.R.. 30. See notes 216-41 infra and accompany-
ing text.
8. IJRC. § 2038.
9. E.g., Estate of Porter v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 915, 919 (1st Cir. 1971)
('The benefits were, in effect, a gift from Porter to his wife."); Estate of Tully v.
United States, 528 F.2d 1401, 1404 (Ct. CL 1976) (ITuly in substance, if not in
form, made a gift of a part of his future earnings to his wife.").
10. Rev. RuL 81-31, 1981-4 LR.B. 30.
11. LR.C. § 2039.
12. I.R.C. § 2039(a):
(a) GeneraL-The gross estate shall include the value of an annuity or
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This section includes in the gross estate the value of an annuity
or other payment receivable by any beneficiary surviving the
decedent under any form of contract or agreement, but only if
under such contract or agreement an annuity or other payment
was payable to the decedent, or would in the future be payable
to the decedent during his or her lifetime.' 3 Section 2039 was
intended to require inclusion of the value of a survivor's rights
in a joint and survivor annuity or similar benefit without resort
to the uncertain applicability of the other more general estate
tax provisions.14 By including a retained lifetime interest re-
quirementl5 in section 2039, however, Congress chose to deal
only with the general problem of joint annuities and "not with
the whole gamut of arrangements under which an employee,
his employer, or both may create benefits for the employee's
survivors."16
Recognizing that some kind of lifetime payment or benefit
was an essential prerequisite to applying section 2039, the Serv-
ice has sought to find such payments outside the typical con-
text of a joint and survivor annuity. An employer and
employee could seemingly avoid the literal application of sec-
tion 2039 by entering into two separate contracts, one for a pure
other payment receivable by any beneficiary by reason of surviving the
decedent under any form of contract or agreement entered into after
March 3, 1931 (other than as insurance under policies on the life of the
decedent), if, under such contract or agreement, an annuity or other
payment was payable to the decedent, or the decedent possessed the
right to receive such annuity or payment, either alone or in conjunction
with another for his life or for any period not ascertainable without ref-
erence to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before
his death.
13. The annuity or other payment is included in the gross estate only in
proportion to that part of the purchase price contributed by the decedent, but
for this purpose, a contribution by the decedent's employer (other than under
qualified plans or other qualified retirement arrangements; see note 1 supra) is
considered to be a contribution by the decedent "if made by reason of employ-
ment." LR.C. § 2039(b).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 90-91, A314-16, reprinted in
[1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4019, 4117, 4457-59; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 123-24, 469-72, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4623, 4756-57, 5113-16. See Bittker, supra note 3, at 469.
Prior to the enactment of LR.C. § 2039 in 1954, the value of the survivor's
rights in a joint annuity purchased by the deceased annuitant was included in
the decedent's gross estate, but the courts had differed as to the reasons. Com-
pare Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 1941), cert denied, 315
U.S. 821 (1942) (purchase of a joint and survivor annuity is a transfer with a
retained life interest taxable under the predecessor of section 2036) with Com-
missioner v. Wilder's Estate, 118 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
634 (1941) (survivor's benefit is a transfer intended to take effect at death).
15. I..C. § 2036(a) (transfers with retained life estate).
16. Estate of Schelberg v. Commissioner, 612 F.2d 25, 30 (2d Cir. 1979).
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death benefit, and another for retirement or other lifetime ben-
efits. The Treasury Regulations, however, foreclose this appar-
ent opportunity by providing that the term "contract or
agreement" includes "any combination of arrangements, under-
standings or plans arising by reason of the decedent's employ-
ment."17 The courts have accepted this interpretation.18
In Estate of Fusz v. Commissioner,19 the Commissioner
took the position that the deceased employee's salary itself
constituted an "other payment" 20 sufficient to bring section
2039 into play. Had this view been upheld, all pure death bene-
fits would have been subject to the estate tax under section
2039. The Tax Court, however, rejected this approach and held
that the phrase "other payment" is "qualitatively limited to
post-employment benefits which, at the very least, are paid or
payable during the decedent's lifetime."21 Since the Commis-
sioner has now acquiesced in Fusz,22 it is clear that a pure em-
ployee death benefit, taken by itself, will not be reached by
section 2039.
Although the treatment of salary is now settled,23 disability
benefits have generated some controversy. In Estate of Bahen
17. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (1) (ii) (1958).
18. See Gray v. United States, 410 F.2d 1094, 1105 (3d Cir. 1969); All v.
McCobb, 321 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1963); Estate of Bahen v. United States, 305
F.2d 827, 830 (Ct CL 1962); Estate of Beal v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 269, 274
(1966).
19. 46 T.C. 214 (1966), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 2.
20. I.RC. § 2039(a).
21. 46 T.C. at 218 (emphasis added). The Commissioner did not argue that
another estate tax provision might be applicable and the Tax Court declined to
expess an opinion with respect to any Internal Revenue Code section other
than § 2039. Id. at 215 n.2.
In Estate of Bahen v. United States, 305 F.2d 827 (Ct. CL. 1962), the govern-
ment also argued that a decedent's regular salary was an "other payment." The
court disagreed, noting that "[s]ince employees normally receive salary or
wages, defendant's interpretation would effectively obliterate, for almost all
employees, the express requirement in Section 2039 of 'an annuity or other
payment' to the decedent. If Congress had intended that strange result, it
would certainly have mentioned or referred to it." Id. at 834.
22. 1967-2 C.B. 2.
23. There does remain a problem, however, of distinguishing between "sal-
ary" and "post employment benefits." A contract with an executive which pro-
vides for lifetime payments in return for his or her consulting services might
well be a disguised retirement annuity. In such cases, the test appears to be
whether the services to be rendered are nominal or pro forma. Compare
Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363, 1366-67 (Ct. CL 1969) (substantial serv-
ices could have been required) with Hetson v. United States, 209 Ct. CL 691, 692
(1976) ("salary" would be payable regardless of amount of time devoted to the
business and ability of employee to perform services) and Silberman v. United
States, 333 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (W.D. Pa. 1971) ("salary" payable even if em-
ployee totally incapacitated).
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v. United States,2 4 an employer had agreed to pay a death ben-
efit to specified beneficiaries in monthly installments. If, how-
ever, the employee became totally disabled prior to retirement,
the payments would be made to the employee; any amounts
unpaid at the employee's death would be paid to the specified
beneficiaries. The employee died while still employed. The
Court of Claims held that the decedent's interest in future disa-
bility benefits, even though contingent, was a sufficient lifetime
benefit to meet the requirement of section 2039.25 Nevertheless,
not every disability benefit plan will result in the inclusion of a
death benefit plan under section 2039. In Revenue Ruling 77-
18326 the Service took the position that wage continuation bene-
fits payable under a short-term (maximum of fifty-two weeks)
sickness and accident income plan were in the nature of salary
and not an "annuity or other payment"27 for purposes of sec-
tion 2039.28
The Service's concession in Revenue Ruling 77-183 may
have triggered some judicial rethinking of the disability benefit
issue. Recently, in Estate of Schelberg v. Commissioner,29 the
Second Circuit seriously questioned the holding in Bahen. The
decedent in Schelberg, an employee of IBM, was covered by a
number of employee benefit plans. Among these were a survi-
vor's income benefit, a qualified pension plan, a short-term dis-
ability plan nearly identical to the one described in Revenue
Ruling 77-183, and a long-term disability plan. At the time of
his death, the employee was not receiving benefits under any of
these plans. The Commissioner sought to include the survi-
vor's income benefit in the deceased employee's gross estate
under section 2039 on the theory that the decedent's contingent
right to long-term disability benefits constituted an "annuity or
other payment." The Tax Court, relying on Bahen, sustained
the Commissioner's position,3 0 but the Second Circuit
reversed.3 '
The Second Circuit could find no principled distinction be-
tween short-term and long-term disability benefits.32 Carefully
reviewing the legislative history of section 2039, the court con-
24. 305 F.2d 827 (Ct. CL 1962).
25. Id. at 831.
26. 1977-1 CE3. 274.
27. IR.C. § 2039.
28. 1977-1 C R. 274, 276.
29. 612 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'g 70 T.C. 690 (1978).
30. 70 T.C. 690, 698-99 (1978), rev'd, 612 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1979).
31. 612 F.2d at 34.
32. Id. at 31.
19821
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cluded that in framing the lifetime benefit condition in section
2039, "[C]ongress was not going beyond benefits the employee
was sure to get as a result of his prior employment if he lived
long enough."3 3 Schelberg does not indicate whether the result
would have been different if the decedent were actually receiv-
ing disability payments at the time of his death. The opinion
does, however, reveal a judicial reluctance to extend the reach
of section 2039 beyond arrangements that more or less resem-
ble the classic joint and survivor annuity.
Although in applying section 2039 the Service has been ag-
gressive in finding the presence of some kind of lifetime bene-
fit, in Revenue Ruling 76-38034 the Service has made a curious
and enormously significant concession. Relying primarily on
some parenthetical language in the regulations,35 the Commis-
sioner concluded that a qualified retirement plan would not be
considered together with a non-qualified death benefit plan in
determining the applicability of section 2039.36 The statute it-
self provides only that death benefits receivable by a benefici-
ary pursuant to a qualified plan are excludable from the gross
estate.37 This provision hardly seems to preclude treating qual-
ified retirement benefits and non-qualified death benefits as
one agreement for purposes of section 2039.38
Revenue Ruling 76-380 permits an employer to set up a
non-qualified death benefit for a select group of employees3 9
that will not be included in a deceased employee's gross estate
under section 2039, even though the employee may also have
been entitled to qualified retirement benefits. Many employees
would not be content to have only death benefits paid to survi-
vors while retaining no retirement benefits, even when they
know that the death benefits would escape section 2039.40 The
33. Id.
34. 1976-2 C.B. 270.
35. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (2), ex. (6) (1958).
36. 1976-2 C.B. 270, 271.
37. See L&C. § 2039(c).
38. The Second Circuit has noted that the language of § 2039(c) "does not
seem to lead inexorably" to the conclusion of Revenue Ruling 76-380. Estate of
Schelberg v. United States, 612 F.2d 25, 29 n.7 (2d Cir. 1979).
39. 1976-2 CB. 270. From an employer's point of view, one drawback of
qualified pension plans is that the benefits are not permitted to discriminate in
favor of employees who are officers, shareholders, or highly compensated.
I.R.C. § 401(a) (4). For a general discussion of the requirements of qualified
plans, see M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIRMENT PLANs (1977).
40. An exception might be the owner of a close corporation who expects to
work until death.
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Service's remarkable concession, therefore, makes the use of
pure death benefit plans even more viable.
Although one can quarrel over the precise scope of the re-
tained interest requirement of section 2039-over how pure the
death benefit must be-a death-benefit-only plan is apparently
outside the reach of 2039. Any attempt to include such benefits
under section 2039 would more properly be directed to Con-
gress than the courts. 41 The inapplicability of section 2039,
however, does not resolve the issue of the estate taxation of
pure death benefits. In enacting section 2039, Congress did not
intend to make it the exclusive statutory provision for taxing
employee death benefits;42 pure death benefits may be subject
to estate taxation under one or more of the other estate tax
provisions.
B. SECTON 2033
The Service has sometimes argued that employee death
benefits are equivalent to property owned by the employee and
therefore are includable in the gross estate under section
2033,43 but this argument usually fails to impress the courts.
Courts base their rejection of the Service's position on a
number of theories, depending to some extent on the nature of
the particular death benefit before the court. For example, if
the employer retains the right to revoke or modify the benefit
at any time prior to the employee's death, the courts regard the
employee's interest in the benefit as something less than prop-
erty.44 Nevertheless, the mere possibility of revocation45 or for-
41. See notes 244-47 infra and accompanying text.
42. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 469, 472, reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5113, 5116. IL.l REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
A314, A316, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ai. NEWS 4453, 4459, states:
"Te provisions of this section shall not prevent the application of any other
provision of law relating to the estate tax."
43. LR.C. § 2033 provides: 'The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the
time of his death."
44. See, e.g., Molter v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 497, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1956);
Dimock v. Corwin, 19 F. Supp. 56, 59 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), affd on other grounds, 99
F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1938), aifd sub. nom. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363
(1939). At the time Dimock was decided, the Treasury itself had taken the posi-
tion that the decedent's interest in such a death benefit "was nothing more
than an expectancy, which is not a property right." G.C.M. 17817, 1937-1 C.B.
281, 282. The Treasury later changed its position, see G.C.M. 27242, 1952-1 C.B.
160, but the court in Molter was unimpressed. See 146 F. Supp. at 500.
45. Cf. Rev. Rul. 67-370, 1967-2 CSB. 324, 325 (a remainder interest which
may be terminated at will by another is an interest in property under LR.C.
§ 2033).
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feiture46 of an interest does not compel the conclusion that no
property interest exists. Moreover, if the employee's death
forecloses revocation or forfeiture, what was perhaps a mere
expectancy undeniably becomes a property interest of obvious
value. Since courts must identify and value interests under
section 2033 at the moment of the decedent's death,47 the possi-
bility that the death benefit plan might be revoked prior to
death cannot by itself render section 2033 inapplicable.
Plans under which the death benefit remains discretionary
with the employer, even after the death of the employee, pres-
ent a different problem. The courts and the Service have con-
cluded that because such plans do not create enforceable rights
to the death benefit, they represent a mere expectancy and not
property under section 2033.48 Although this result has a cer-
tain logical appeal, it ignores the reality of the restraints im-
posed on employers both by the marketplace for skilled
employees and by the need to enhance productivity by main-
taining good employee relations.49 As a practical matter, the
employer's ability to withhold the benefit is largely irrelevant
since, for readily apparent business reasons, it would be foolish
to do so. Thus, what is technically an expectancy may have
substantial value. One court has held that unenforceability is
not "conclusive" of the includability issue, but rather is "impor-
tant principally as an indication of the likelihood that the
agreements will be honored in fact."50 This kind of wealth, gen-
erated as it is by the lifetime efforts of the decedent, should
certainly be within the reach of the estate tax.51
46. See Estate of King v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 930, 935 (1953); Rev. Rul.
65-217, 1965-2 C.B. 214, 216 (decedent's conditional right to benefits, which be-
comes the unconditional right of his estate upon his death, is property included
under I.R.C. § 2033).
47. See United States v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 470 F.2d 6 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972); Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957); Christiernin v. Manning, 138 F. Supp. 923 (D.N.J.
1956).
48. See Estate of Bogley v. United States, 514 F.2d 1027 (Ct. C1. 1975); Es-
tate of Barr v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 227 (1963); Estate of Salt v. Commissioner,
17 T.C. 92 (1951); Rev. Rul 65-217, 1956-2 C.B. 214. But see Estate of Porter v.
Commissioner, 442 F.2d 915, 918-19 (1st Cir. 1971).
49. See Kramer, supra note 3, at 349-50.
50. Estate of Porter v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 915, 918-19 (1st Cir. 1971).
51. In First Victoria Nat'l Bank v. United States, 620 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir.
1980), the court rejected a claim that a certain interest ("rice acreage history")
was not property under IR.C. § 2033 and stated:
Possible revocability is not a destroyer. "Ifs," "maybes," modifiers, and
contingencies might negate the concept of property, but we must be
certain that the analysis is a pragmatic one, not a theoretical one. So
[Vol. 66:229
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The revocable or unenforceable nature of certain employee
death benefits has not, however, been the only source of judi-
cial reluctance to include such benefits under section 2033.
Courts have also refused to apply section 2033 even if the bene-
fit could not be withdrawn by the employer.52 Some courts the-
orize that the deceased employee had no right to any payments
and therefore had no section 2033 interest.53 Under this view,
the beneficiary holds the property right. Other courts accept
the possibility that the decedent may have had a property in-
terest in his or her employment agreement, but hold that such
interest terminates at death, placing the decedent's interest,
like a life estate, beyond the reach of section 2033.54 The clear-
est example of this approach is the Tax Court's decision in Es-
tate of Wadewitz v. Commissioner.55
In Wadewitz, the decedent had entered into a contract with
his employer whereby the decedent would receive monthly
payments for a fifteen year term following his retirement or the
termination of his employment. If the decedent died prior to
the end of the fifteen year period, the remaining payments
were to be made to named beneficiaries. The decedent died
while still employed. Viewing the decedent's interest under
the contract as an interest separate from that of the benefi-
ciaries, the court held that death terminated the decedent's in-
terest and caused the remainder interest of the beneficiaries to
long as an interest is not chimerical, it should fall within the broad
reach of the taxing statute.
Id. at 1104.
Essentially the same issue can arise in connection with any of the Internal
Revenue Code sections defining the gross estate. See Estate of Porter v. Com-
missioner, 442 F.2d 915, 918-19 (1st Cir. 1971) (LR.C. § 2035); Neely v. United
States, 613 F.2d 802 (Ct. CL 1980) (LR.C. § 2039). See also notes 245-51 infra and
accompanying text.
52. See Worthen v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 727, 734 (D. Mass. 1961)
(construing section 811(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939); Estate of
Tully v. United States, 528 F.2d 1401, 1406 (Ct. CL 1976); Kramer v. United
States, 406 F.2d 1363, 1370 (Ct. CL 1969); Estate of Wadewitz v. Commissioner,
39 T.C. 925, 933 (1963), affid on other grounds, 339 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1964); Harris
v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 12,845 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Hinze v.
United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 12,842 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
53. See, e.g., Worthen v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 727, 733 (D. Mass. 1961).
54. See Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363 (Ct. CL 1969); Estate of
Porter v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1066 (1970) (Tannenwald, J., concurring), affd
on other grounds, 442 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1971); Estate of Wadewitz v. Commis-
sioner, 39 T.C. 925 (1963), affd on other grounds, 339 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1964).
But see Estate of Porter v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. at 1079 (Quealy, J., concur-
ring) (contractual pure death benefit includable in the gross estate under L2R.C.
§ 2033).
55. 39 T.C. 925 (1963), affd on other grounds, 339 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1964).
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become "fixed."56
The Tax Court's analysis in Wadewitz provides a satisfac-
tory interpretation of section 2033. The key principle is that
section 2033 does not reach property interests which terminate
at death. In this context, the Tax Court suggests that an inter-
est terminates when it is not transferable through the dece-
dent's estate either by will or intestacy.57 Thus, the contract in
Wadewitz created two separate interests, both of which were
contingent. One belonged to the decedent and the other be-
longed to the beneficiaries as third party beneficiaries under
the contract. Because the beneficiaries did not derive their in-
terest from the decedent's estate, the interest was outside the
scope of 2033.58
In a small number of cases, however, the Government has
successfully included employee death benefits under section
2033 or its predecessor in the 1939 Code, section 811(a).5 9 In
each case the decedents themselves had a right to payments
during their lifetimes and thus the death benefits would today
be reached by section 2039.60 The cases can be divided into two
classes, depending on whether the death benefit was payable to
the decedent's estate or to other beneficiaries. Those cases
which concern death benefits payable to the deceased em-
ployee's estate6l are not contrary to the Wadewitz interpreta-
tion of section 2033. A right to have payments made to one's
estate is an interest held by the decedent during his or her life
that becomes the right of the estate at death, just as any typical
property interest of a decedent becomes the property of his or
her estate.62
56. 39 T.C. at 935.
57. Id.
58. Their interest is, however, included under LP.C. § 2039 because the de-
ceased employee had a right to payments during his lifetime.
59. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. § 811(a), 53 Stat. 120 (now LR.C. § 2033).
60. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
61. See Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1957); Beaver Trust Co.
v. United States, 184 F. Supp. 553 (WMD. Pa. 1960); Estate of King v. Commis-
sioner, 20 T.C. 930 (1953).
62. The employee death benefit can be analogized to A's interest in a trust
that is to pay the income to B for A's life, remainder to A's estate. Although A
could not possess any income or corpus during A's life, it is hardly a forced
reading of LR.C. § 2033 to view A as possessing a right at death that could be
transmitted and is therefore an interest embraced by section 2033. Commenta-
tors have differed on whether section 2033 reaches a remainder interest passing
to the estate of the life tenant. Compare S. SuRREY, W. WARREN, P. McDAMNnL
& H. GUTMAN, supra note 3, at 105 (yes) with R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFiELD, & S.
LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 4.05[6] n.65 (4th ed. 1978) (no). In
Second Nat'l Bank of Danville v. Dallmon, 209 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1954), the court
[Vol. 66:229
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The more troublesome cases are those that have applied
section 2033 or its predecessors to benefits payable to a benefi-
ciary other than the deceased employee's estate. Thus several
courts have concluded that if an employee becomes entitled to
accrued benefits in an employer-funded qualified retirement
trust, and has the right to designate the beneficiaries of that
part of the account which remains unpaid at death, the dece-
dent's control over the benefit renders it includable under sec-
tion 811(a) of the 1939 Code.63 The leading case, Garber v.
Commissioner,6A expresses the broad rationale that "death ben-
efits derived from funds which represent deferred compensa-
tion to the decedent, or granted under plans which explicitly
gave the decedent direct contractual rights in the funds," are
included under section 811(a) of the 1939 Code.65
Any employee death benefit can obviously be viewed as
"deferred compensation." Later cases, however, have limited
the reach of this doctrine to situations in which the decedents
retain the right to receive payments from the fund until the
time of their death.66 Garber therefore provides scant author-
ity for the inclusion of a pure death benefit under section
refused to include such an interest under the predecessor of section 2033, but
the Service does not appear to have abandoned its claim that section 2033 ap-
plies. See Keeter v. United States, 461 F.2d 714, 719 n.3 (5th Cir. 1972).
Even if section 2033 would not reach such an interest, it would seem that
the ability to dispose of one's estate by will should constitute a general power
of appointment over the benefit, which would cause the benefit to be taxed
under I.R.C. § 2041. The Danville court rejected this result, but the Service an-
nounced it would not follow Danville, Rev. Rul. 55-277, 1955-1 C.B. 456, 457, and
the Service's position was upheld in Keeter.
63. See Rosenberg v. United States, 309 F.2d 724, 727 (7th Cir. 1962); Estate
of Garber v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 97, 104 (3d Cir. 1959). The only significant
difference between the two cases is that in Rosenberg installment payments of
the accrued benefit had commenced during the decedent's life, while in Garber
the decedent had elected to leave the benefit in the trust. In both cases, the
decedents could have named their estates as the beneficiary. See also Estate of
Wolf v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 441 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 264 F.2d 82 (3d
Cir. 1959) (reaching the same result as Rosenberg and Garber although the em-
ployee could have forfeited all benefits merely by leaving the job).
In Eichstedt v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the court
took the same approach to an unfunded benefit. The decedent was an insur-
ance salesman who had an agreement with his employer that if he died, as he
did, before retirement, his widow was to receive for a period of up to three
years from his death one-half of the renewal commissions that he would have
received had he lived. The court concluded that the renewal commissions were
includable in the decedent's gross estate under LR.C. § 2033. Id. at 490.
64. 271 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1959).
65. Id. at 101.
66. See Estate of Porter v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 915, 919 (1st Cir. 1971);
Worthen v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 727, 733 (D. Mass. 1961).
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2033.67 To so include the pure death benefit would produce a
profoundly novel definition of the terms "property" and "inter-
est.., of the decedent"68 as used in section 2033.69 Short of
this strained construction, the courts cannot properly include
pure death benefits in the deceased employee's gross estate
under section 2033.
C. THE LIFETIME TRANSFER SECTIONS
The federal estate tax reaches more than just the property
owned by a decedent. Congress has provided in sections 2035
through 203870 that certain lifetime transfers of property are
sufficiently testamentary to justify subjecting the property to
estate taxation. This section of the Article examines the appli-
cability of these Code sections71 to the pure death benefit.
67. The courts applying LR.C. § 2033 to employee death benefits have suc-
cumbed to the temptation, not wholly unreasonable, of viewing the right to
have payments made to oneself, coupled with the right to have the payments
made to one's beneficiaries if one dies, as equivalent to ownership of the pay-
ments. Although the courts have warmly embraced the concept of substantial
ownership for income tax purposes, see Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335
(1940) (construing section 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934), courts have been
reluctant to read section 2033 as broadly as section 61. See generally Stephens,
The Clifford Shadow Over the Federal Estate Tax, 4 GA. L REv. 233 (1970).
Thus the Supreme Court has held that section 2033 does not reach a life estate
in property or a testamentary general power of appointment over property,
even if both are held together. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S.
56, 66 (1942) (construing section 302(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926, now LR.C.
§ 2033). A life interest in a trust, coupled with a general power to withdraw the
corpus for one's own use, was similarly held not includable under the predeces-
sor of section 2033, despite the Government's claim that the decedent was in
substance the owner of the property. See Estate of Royce v. Commissioner, 46
B.T.A. 1090, 1093 (1942).
68. I.R.C. § 2033.
69. A right to the payment of money would be an interest of the decedent
in property even though the decedent could never receive the money while
alive, nor could the decedent's estate receive the money after his death. One
cannot attribute to Congress such a strained use of language, especially in light
of the Supreme Court's conclusion that section 2033 does not reach a general
power of appointment. See note 67 supra.
70. I.R.C. §§ 2035-2038, as amended by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
Pub. L No. 97-34, § 424(a), 95 Stat. 172.
71. LR.C. § 2036 is not discussed because section 2036 does not play a sig-
nificant role in the taxation of pure death benefits. Section 2036(a) provides:
(a) General Rule.-The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property to the extent of any interest therein or which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life
or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for
any period which does not in fact end before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of; or the right to the income
from, the property, or
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In order to include an interest in property in the gross es-
tate, the lifetime transfer provisions all require that the dece-
dent have "made a transfer" of the "property" interest.72 The
lack of any obvious transfer of property by the employee has
troubled some of the courts that have considered the applica-
tion of these provisions to employee death benefits. In cases in
which a decedent purchased a joint and survivor annuity, the
courts have had little difficulty in concluding that a "transfer"
occurred.73 The courts disagree on the tax consequence if the
employer purchased or provided the benefit. Some courts have
refused to find a transfer if the benefit was voluntarily cre-
ated,7 4 discretionary, 5 or forfeitable.76 A transfer has been
found, however, where the decedent qualified for an annuity
but elected to receive a reduced annuity to provide his spouse
with a survivor's annuity.7 7 Finally, if the decedent procured a
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the
income therefrom.
Id. Since the employee receives no lifetime benefits from the death benefit, the
retained interest necessary to trigger the application of section 2036(a) (1) is
absent. Even if there were lifetime benefits, so that the benefits were not pure,
this would cause section 2039 to apply to the death benefit and section
2036(a) (1) would be redundant. If the employee had the right to alter the bene-
ficiary, this would probably qualify as a section 2036(a) (2) right to "designate
the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property," LIC. § 2036(a) (2), but in
any event such a power would cause inclusion of the benefit in the deceased
employee's gross estate under LR.C. § 2038. See notes 150-52 infra and accom-
panying text. Section 2036(a) (2) may not even be applicable to the pure death
benefit since, under the Regulations, a power to affect the enjoyment of prop-
erty only after one's death is not within the scope of the section. See Treas.
Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (3) (1958).
72. LR.C. §§ 2035(a), 2036(a), 2037(a), 2038(a)(1)-(2). There is nothing in
the statute, regulations, or legislative history to suggest a different standard of
interpretation for the term "transfer" as is used in the various inter vivos trans-
fer provisions. Estate of Kopperman v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1849-24
(1978). But see Harris v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 12,845 (C.D.
Cal. 1972).
73. Estate of Mearkle v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 386, 388 (3d Cir. 1942);
Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S.
821 (1942); Commissioner v. Wilder's Estate, 118 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 314 U.S. 634 (1941).
74. Provident Trust Co. v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 74, 77 (E.D. Pa. 1959);
Hanner v. Glenn, 111 F. Supp. 52, 58 (W.D. Ky. 1953); Estate of Saxton v. Com-
missioner, 12 T.C. 569, 575 (1949). In Libbey v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 383
(N.D. Cal. 1956), the court reached the same result without discussion of the
"voluntary" versus "contractual" distinction, although the facts indicate that
the plan was probably "voluntary." Id. at 384.
75. Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 657, 664-65 (1950).
76. Estate of Stake v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 817, 825 (1948).
77. See Davis v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 378, 381 (1956); Estate of Twogood v.
Commissioner, 15 T.C. 989, 997 (1950), affld on other grounds, 194 F.2d 1627 (2d
Cir. 1952); Estate of Higgs v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 280, 283 (1949), rev'd on
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survivor's benefit from the employer in return for the perform-
ance of services during the course of employment, a substantial
body of authority provides that the transfer requirement is
satisfied.78
A leading case applying the "transfer" requirement to an
employee death benefit is Estate of Porter v. Commissioner.7 9
Bernard Porter was employed by three corporations that he
and his two brothers owned. The day before Bernard under-
went surgery, he entered into identical agreements with each
of the corporations to provide death benefits to his wife or chil-
dren if he should die while employed by the corporations. Ber-
nard died less than three weeks later. The Tax Court
concluded, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that for the pur-
poses of section 2035 Bernard "made a transfer of property by
entering into the agreements." 80
other grounds, 184 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1950). But see Libbey v. United States, 147
F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
In Estate of Howell v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 224 (1950), a similar election
was found not to constitute a transfer when, at the time of election, the dece-
dent's right to the annuity payments was not yet "vested," but was contingent
on his remaining living and in the employ of his employer for five more years.
In the court's view, the decedent had no property right that could be trans-
ferred. Id. at 231.
78. See Estate of Porter v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 915, 919 (1st Cir. 1971),
ajj'g 54 T.C. 1066 (1970); Worthen v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 727, 734 (D.
Mass. 1961); Estate of Tully v. United States, 528 F.2d 1401, 1404 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
Estate of Bogley v. United States, 514 F.2d 1027, 1039 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Estate of
Siegel v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 613, 622-24 (1980); Estate of Kopperman v. Com-
missioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1849-24 (1978); Leoni v. Commissioner, 7 T.C.M.
(CCH) 759 (1948). Contra, Harris v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
12,845 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Hinze v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
12,842 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
The Service has also adopted this view. See Rev. Rul 78-15, 1978-1 C.B. 289;
Rev. Rul. 76-304, 1976-2 C.B. 269. This approach is actually a corollary of a more
general rule that a "transfer" occurs whenever the decedent provides consider-
ation to a third party in exchange for the death benefit. See Estate of Fried v.
Commissioner, 445 F.2d 979, 984 (2d Cir. 1971), cer denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972)
(transfer of partnership assets to corporation in return for death benefits); Es-
tate of Nevin v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 59, 65 (1948) (agreement to retire from a
position that decedent could not have been forced to retire from in return for
death benefits).
79. 54 T.C. 1066 (1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1971).
80. 54 T.C. at 1076. The court also held that the transfer was in contempla-
tion of death. Until 1977, LR.C. § 2035 applied a subjective contemplation of
death test: '"The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer..., by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of death." Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2035, 68A Stat. 381. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
changed this to an automatic inclusion of transfers within three years of death.
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L No. 94-455, § 2001 (a) (5), 90 Stat. 1848, (amend-
ing I.R.C. § 2035). See note 94 infra. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub.
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To support this conclusion, both courts relied on the lan-
guage contained in the Supreme Court decision in Chase Na-
tional Bank v. United States.81  In what was essentially
dictum, 82 the Court stated that the word "transfer" in the estate
tax statute was not to be construed so narrowly as to encom-
pass only the passing of property directly from the decedent to
the transferee. 3 Rather, the court noted, "transfer" also in-
cludes "the transfer of property procured through expenditures
by the decedent with the purpose, effected at his death, of hav-
ing it pass to another."84
Chase stands for the principle that a decedent who fur-
nishes the consideration for the payment by another to a bene-
ficiary upon the decedent's death has made a "transfer" of
"property" for estate tax purposes.8 5 The courts nevertheless
display a certain amount of confusion in applying this seem-
ingly self-evident principle to employee death benefits. An ex-
ample outside the employment context is therefore useful.
Assume that X pays Y $100 in return for Y's promise to pay
Z, at X's death, $100 plus compound interest at six percent. X
has certainly transferred the $100; furthermore, this transfer is
clearly to Y. This transfer, however, also creates a property in-
terest in Z, namely the contractual right to the $100 plus inter-
est that pursuant to Chase is property "of which the decedent
has ... made a transfer."8 6 Thus one or more of the lifetime
transfer sections could reach the claim to the $100 plus interest,
provided that the other requirements, apart from a "transfer"
of '"property," are met.87
Assume that instead of $100 plus interest, Y, being a person
who enjoys gambling, promises to pay Z $150 at X's death. Af-
L. No. 97-34, § 424(a), 95 Stat. 172, has now virtually repealed section 2035. See
notes 93-105 infra and accompanying text.
81. 278 U.S. 327, 337 (1929).
82. In Chase, the decedent had purchased life insurance and made his wife
the beneficiary. The decedent's executor argued that the statute that subjected
insurance proceeds to estate taxation was unconstitutional since it was an
unapportioned direct tax on property rather than a tax on the "transfer" of
property by the decedent. In the executor's view, there was nothing to which a
transfer or privilege tax could apply, since the beneficiary's interest in the pol-
icy was not transferred from the decedent, but rather from the insurer. The
Supreme Court upheld the tax. Id.
83. 278 U.S. at 337.
84. Id.
85. Numerous other decisions have also adopted this interpretation. See
note 78 supra.
86. 278 U.S. at 337.
87. See generally LR.C. §§ 2035-2038, as amended by Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. I No. 97-34, § 424(a), 95 Stat. 172.
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ter examining X's health and consulting actuarial tables, Y de-
termines that on the average, paying $150 will cost as much as
paying $100 plus interest. If X dies early, Y loses the gamble,
but if X lives well beyond his life expectancy, Y stands to make
a profit. Y's promise is, of course, the functional equivalent of a
life insurance contract. The risk component present in this hy-
pothetical seems irrelevant to the application of the Chase prin-
ciple. The nature of the property interest transferred differs
from that in the first hypothetical, but it nonetheless is "prop-
erty" of which the decedent has made a "transfer."
Now consider the second hypothetical in an employment
context. Assume that X is employed by Y and that X and Y
agree that for X's services during the year X will be paid $5,000
and that Y will pay Z $150 at X's death. In substance this is no
different from an agreement by Y to pay X $5,100 and a simulta-
neous agreement by X to pay Y $100 in return for Y's payment
of $150 to Z at X's death. The Tax Court in Porter expressly
adopted this view.88 As a matter of tax policy, the two arrange-
ments are indistinguishable. Thus once one accepts the exist-
ence of a "transfer" of "property" in the case of a purchase for
cash, it is but a short and logical step to conclude that in the
case of other consideration, such as services, the result should
be the same.
Some early cases refused to apply the Chase principle to
death benefits unilaterally established by the employer.89
These courts reasoned that the decedent could not have made
or procured a transfer of property unless the death benefit had
been specifically bargained for.90 This argument ignores, how-
ever, the reality of the employer-employee relationship. These
ostensibly voluntary benefits are certainly part of the employ-
ment contract; the employer's total compensation package con-
stitutes an offer by the employer that the employee accepts by
working.91 The employer establishes fringe benefits, including
death benefits, in order to recruit and retain employees. The
goal of the employer is to motivate employees, not to bestow
gifts out of some deep affection for the employee's relatives.
Whether the employee had an opportunity to bargain over the
88. 54 T.C. at 1071-72. Accord, Estate of Kopperman v. Commissioner, 37
T.C.M. (CCH) 1849-24 (1978). See also Estate of Fried v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
805, 823 (1970), affd 445 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972).
89. E.g., Estate of Saxton v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 569, 575-76 (1949). See
also the cases cited in note 74 supra.
90. 54 T.C. at 1070.
91. See RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAT s §§ 12, 29 (1932).
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precise structure of his compensation plan is irrelevant. The
death benefit is a reward for the employee's services, and as
such it is properly treated as indirectly transferred by the
employee. 92
1. Section 2035
Before the enactment of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981,93 property interests transferred by a decedent within
three years of death without adequate consideration were in-
cluded in the decedent's gross estate under section 2035(a). 94
The original purpose of section 2035 was to prevent estate tax
avoidance by means of lifetime gifts shortly before death.95
The unification of the estate and gift taxes under the Tax Re-
form Act of 197696 reduced the significance of section 2035(a) to
a great extent.97 Under the unified transfer tax system, the ef-
fect of section 2035(a) was to subject post-gift appreciation to
transfer taxation. Congress has now determined that the taxa-
tion of such appreciation is generally unnecessary.98
By enacting new section 2035(d) (1),99 Congress has made
section 2035(a) inapplicable to the estates of decedents dying
after December 31, 1981. Important exceptions remain, how-
ever. For example, under new section 2035(d) (2),100 section
2035(a) remains applicable "to a transfer of an interest in prop-
92. This position finds support in the income tax treatment of fringe bene-
fits; payments by an employer to relatives of the employee, such as tuition pay-
ments for children, are considered taxable income to the employee, even if the
employee did not bargain for the benefit. See, e.g., Grant-Jacoby v. Commis-
sioner, 73 T.C. 700, 708 (1980). See also Armantrout v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 996
(1977), affid per curiam, 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978); Blum, The Educational
Benefit Trust as a Lesson in Taxation, 56 TAXEs 600 (1978).
93. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 [hereinafter cited and referred to as the
1981 Act].
94. LR.C. § 2035(a) provides:
(a) Inclusion of Gifts Made by Decedent-Except as provided in sub-
section (b), the value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
as at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, during the 3-
year period ending on the date of the decedent's death.
95. See Garber v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 97, 101 (3d Cir. 1959).
96. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001 (a) (1), 90 Stat. 1525.
97. The 1976 Act also amended I.R.C. § 2035 to provide that any gift taxes
paid on gifts made by a decedent after 1976, and within three years of death,
are to be included in the decedent's gross estate. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a) (5), 90 Stat. 1525.
98. See HR. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 186-97 (1981).
99. I.R.C. § 2035(d) (1), added by 1981 Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 424(a), 95
Stat. 172.
100. I.R.C. § 2035(d) (2), added by 1981 Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 424(a), 95
Stat. 172.
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erty which is included in the value of the gross estate under
sections 2036, 2037, 2038, 2041, or 2042 or would have been in-
cluded under any of such sections if such interest had been re-
tained by the decedent."os Gifts of life insurance, in particular,
continue to be covered by sections 2035(a) and 2042.102 Thus, if
one year prior to death a decedent transferred all of the inci-
dents of ownership in a life insurance policy, the entire amount
of the proceeds would be included in the decedent's gross
estate. 0 3
Although prior to the 1981 Act, section 2035 would have in-
cluded in the gross estate any pure death benefit created
within three years of the decedent's death,104 the 1981 Act ap-
pears to have changed this result.05 Pure death benefits may
now be outside the scope of taxation under section 2035. Under
a literal reading of section 2035(d), an employer and employee
can contractually establish a pure death benefit payable to
101. Id.
102. See I.R.C. § 2042.
103. See S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 139 (1981). The 1981 Act pro-
vides another exception to the general repeal of LR.C. § 2035(a). Under section
2035(d) (3), section 2035(a) continues to apply for purposes of determining the
estate's eligibility for favorable redemption, see section 303(b), valuation, see
section 2032A, and deferral provisions, see section 6166. These additional ex-
ceptions were motivated by congressional concern about the possibility of tax-
payers using deathbed transfers to obtain tax benefits for the beneficiaries, or
the estate, that would otherwise be unavailable.
104. See Estate of Porter v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1066, 1076 (1970), afjld,
442 F.2d 915, 920 (1st Cir. 1971); Estate of Kopperman v. Commissioner, 37
T.C.M. (CCH) 1849-24, 1849-30 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 187
(1981).
105. None of the Internal Revenue Code sections enumerated in LR.C.
§ 2035(d) (2) expressly deals with employee death benefits. The omission of
section 2039 is particularly striking. Suppose an employer provides a joint and
survivor annuity to an employee and the employee's spouse. One year before
his death, the employee assigns all of his interest in the annuity to his spouse.
The surviving spouse's annuity would not be included in the decedent's gross
estate under section 2039 since the decedent had no lifetime benefit at the time
of his death. Prior to the 1981 Act, it was generally assumed that section 2035
would apply in this situation, thus causing the value of the annuity to be in-
cluded in the decedent's gross estate, even though a literal reading of section
2035 could lead to a contrary result. See C. LouNDEs, R. KRAmER, & J. McCoRD,
FEbERAL EsTATE AND GiFT TAxEs 91-95 (3d ed. 1974). By omitting section 2039
from the special rule of section 2035(d) (2), Congress may have created an im-
portant pre-mortem planning device. Employees receiving non-qualified annui-
ties (or entitled to receive non-qualified annuities in the future) who discover
they are terminally ill might be able to remove the survivor's annuity from
their gross estate merely by assigning their own annuity. The Commissioner
might challenge this result by resurrecting the arguments, made before the en-
actment of section 2039 in 1954, that section 2036 also reaches joint annuities.
See note 14 supra.
[Vol. 66:229
PURE DEATH BENEFIT
some beneficiary and have this benefit excluded from the em-
ployee's gross estate.
a. The Life Insurance Exception
As noted above,10 6 Congress excepted life insurance from
the general repeal of section 2035(a).10 7 If the insured assigned
all rights in an insurance policy within three years of death, the
courts will include the proceeds in the insured's gross estate
under section 2035(a).10 8
From the beneficiary's point of view, an employer-provided
pure death benefit and an employer-provided life insurance
policy are nearly indistinguishable. 0 9 The only significant dif-
ference is that the promise of the employer has replaced the
promise of an insurance company." 0 The question therefore
arises whether a pure death benefit is a life insurance policy
for estate tax purposes.
In the leading case of Helvering v. Le Gierse,111 the
Supreme Court held that the essential feature of a life insur-
ance contract is "risk-shifting and risk-distributing."112 More-
over, the requisite risk-shifting is not limited to contracts
issued by an insurance company. Thus, for example, if a stock
exchange assesses its members to fund death benefits for the
families of deceased members, the courts find a sufficient shift-
106. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
107. The statute reaches this result as follows: section 2042 includes in the
gross estate of a decedent the proceeds of life insurance policies on the life of
the decedent if the proceeds are payable to the decedent's estate or if the dece-
dent possessed at his death "any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable ei-
ther alone or in conjunction with any other person." IR.C. § 2042. Thus if a
decedent had retained a life insurance policy, instead of transferring it before
his death, it would have been included in his gross estate under section 2042.
Therefore LR.C. § 2035(d)(2) makes section 2035(d)(1) inapplicable to the
transfer. Since section 2035(d) (1) is inapplicable, section 2035(a) continues to
apply.
108. Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1(a)(2) (1958). See, e.g., Estate of Compton v.
Commissioner, 532 F.2d 1086, 1088 (6th Cir. 1976); Bermon v. United States, 487
F.2d 70, 73 (5th Cir. 1973); Rev. RuL 79-231, 1979-2 C.B. 323, 324. For a recent per-
ceptive discussion of the estate and gift tax consequences of the assignment of
life insurance, see Kahn & Waggoner, Federal Taxation of the Assignment of
Life Insurance, 1977 DuKE L.J. 941.
109. But see note 206 infra.
110. This difference can, of course, be important if the employer is
financially unstable. Cf. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 484 F.2d 1300 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974) (employees with vested rights to deferred
compensation awarded approximately one-fourth of benefit in settlement with
the bankruptcy trustee).
111. 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
112. Id. at 539.
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ing of the risk of loss to justify the characterization of the ar-
rangement as life insurance. 113
In All v. McCobb,114 however, an unfunded employee death
benefit plan was held not to constitute a life insurance policy
under section 2039. Given the absence of any premiums or
reserves, the court could find no "gamble" with the decedent
nor any undertaking to "distribute among a larger group of em-
ployees, on the basis of actuarial data from which the appropri-
ate size of a terminal reserve could be computed, the risk of the
premature death of a single employee."" 5 The court distin-
guished a mere "promise to pay a sum certain to a named ben-
eficiary upon the death of a retired employee" from a life
insurance policy." 6
Although All v. McCobb supports the proposition that a
pure death benefit is not a life insurance policy,"17 the court's
analysis is subject to criticism. The pure death benefit is not
functionally distinguishable from term life insurance.118 The
death benefit, like any other employee benefit, is a substitute
for salary, and the employee in effect pays a premium to the
employer by accepting the benefit in lieu of cash. The em-
ployer makes a gamble just like a life insurance company; an
employee who dies prematurely is overcompensated, but an
employee who works for many years and then retires is un-
dercompensated. Also, to the extent the employer has more
than one employee, the employer can spread the risk to pro-
duce, in effect, an annual actuarial cost for providing the bene-
fit. This cost is paid by the services of each employee covered
under the death benefit plan.
Moreover, both the pure death benefit and employer-pro-
vided life insurance present similar tax avoidance problems."19
113. See Commissioner v. Tregonowan, 183 F.2d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950); Estate of Moyer v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 515, 527
(1959); Estate of Edmunds v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 110, 118 (1951); cf. Ross v.
Odom, 401 F.2d 464, 473 (5th Cir. 1968) (operation of state survivor's benefit plan
was based on actuarial computations and involved sufficient risk-shifting to
constitute life insurance).
114. 321 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1963).
115. Id. at 637.
116. Id.
117. Cf. Essenfeld v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 208, 209 (2d Cir. 1962) (em-
ployee death benefit not a life insurance contract for income tax purposes). See
also Estate of Morrow v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1068, 1071 (1953) (employee
death benefit not proceeds of life insurance under predecessor of IR.C. § 2042).
118. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Comment, Estate Taxa-
tion of Employee Death Benefits, 66 YALE L.J. 1217, 1237 (1957).
119. The legislative history is strangely silent as to Congress's reason for
enacting the life insurance exception, or any of the other exceptions contained
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If section 2035(d) (2) does not include transfers of pure death
benefits, artificial distinctions between similarly situated tax-
payers may result. An employee who is covered under a
$200,000 group term life insurance policy is in essentially the
same economic position as an employee covered under an em-
ployer-provided $200,000 pure death benefit plan. If both assign
the rights to their benefits to their respective spouses and both
are killed in automobile accidents the next day, there is no logi-
cal reason to distinguish between the two benefits for federal
estate tax purposes.
b. The Timing of the Transfer
Section 2035(a) continues to apply to employee death bene-
fits for decedents who die before 1982. Section 2035(a) also de-
termines the estate's eligibility for favorable redemption,
valuation, and deferral provisions.120 Furthermore, if the Serv-
ice succeeds in arguing that employee death benefits are life in-
surance, section 2035(a) may apply to decedents dying in
future years. The exact timing of the transfer of an employee
death benefit therefore remains significant.
Although the courts generally conclude that the transfer of
an employee death benefit occurs when the employee enters
into a contract with the employer,121 the analysis by these
courts is deficient. One significant difficulty with this approach,
the so-called continuum approach, 22 involves the proper treat-
ment of contract modifications. Consider the example of a one
year contract. Assume that each year the employer and em-
in LR.C. § 2035(d) (2). It would seem that Congress was concerned about estate
tax avoidance schemes. Unlike most other assets, life insurance has the capac-
ity to multiply in value due to the death of the insured. An insured who deter-
mined that his or her death was possible in the near future, either through
illness or increased exposure to accidental injury, might be tempted to transfer
the policy, and thereby remove the proceeds from the gross estate. Similarly,
the owner of a life interest in some property, who had previously transferred
the remainder interest, might be tempted to transfer the life interest, and
thereby remove the property from his gross estate, which would otherwise be
included under LR.C. § 2036. This temptation would be enhanced by the likeli-
hood that the valuation of the policy for gift tax purposes would not be in-
creased to reflect the increased probability of death.
120. See note 103 supra.
121. See cases cited in note 104 supra.
122. Assume that X and Y agreed on January 1, 1980, that X would be paid
$500 per week, and that if X should die while employed by Y, Y would pay Z,
X's spouse, $25,000. If X dies on January 2, 1983, the courts hold that LR.C.
§ 2035 does not reach the $25,000. Under the continuum approach, Z received a
right, albeit subject to several contingencies, on January 1, 1980, to receive the
$25,000 at X's death; this right existed continuously from January 1, 1980, to the
date of X's death.
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ployee negotiate a contract for the coming year. In some years
they have included various forms of death benefits, and in
others they have not. In the last five years, they have consist-
ently agreed to a $25,000 benefit. If the employee dies during
the current year, can it realistically be said that the benefici-
ary's right to the $25,000 was transferred five years ago? The
proper view is that the beneficiary had a right in prior years,
but that right became valueless when the year ended. The ben-
eficiary's present right to the $25,000 originated at the earliest
in the current year.
An employment-at-will contract is analytically equivalent
to successive one-year contracts. In a manner analogous to the
negotiation of an annual employment contract, the employer's
compensation offer is accepted by working that day.123 Be-
cause the employer and employee are free to renegotiate the
employee's compensation, the beneficiary's rights arise out of
the current agreement. The equivalence of the old and new
benefit packages is irrelevant. In effect, the "transfer" of the
right occurs continually during the term of employment.
Nevertheless, the courts do not regard a mere continuation
of a death benefit provision in a new contract as a new trans-
fer.124 Not surprisingly, if a new contract was signed within
three years of death, taxpayers have sought to bring their situa-
tion within this rule. In Porter, the death benefit agreement re-
placed a prior agreement entered into nine years earlier. The
Tax Court rejected the estate's continuation argument, noting
three factors: the later agreement provided for a larger benefit,
payable over a longer time period; the prior agreements were
formally cancelled; and the later agreement added a clause that
the agreement could not be modified or terminated without the
consent of both parties.125 The Court of Appeals attached little
significance to the last two factors, describing them as purely
"formal considerations" 126 even without a "no termination"
clause, in the court's view, the agreement could still be modi-
fied by a subsequent agreement.127 But the Court of Appeals
agreed that the creation of a "more liberal provision" made the
123. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 12, 29 (1932).
124. See Estate of Porter v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1066, 1076 (1970), affd,
442 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1971); Estate of Kopperman v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1849-24 (1978).
125. 54 T.C. at 1077.
126. 442 F.2d at 920 n.9.
127. Id.
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new agreement a transfer in contemplation of death.128
As a factual matter it is not clear that the new benefit was
more liberal,129 but even if it were, why should the entire bene-
fit be treated as a new transfer? Under the continuum ap-
proach, it would seem that only the additional benefit should
be considered transferred by the new agreement, since the
prior benefit remains in effect.130 In addition, it may often be
difficult to determine whether a modified benefit is to be
treated as a new transfer. For example, does a change in the
payment from a lump sum to two installments thirty days apart
result in a new transfer?
These problems display the basic inadequacy of the contin-
uum theory and suggest a plausible alternative-the continu-
ous transfer theory. Because the existence of the death benefit
depends on the employee's daily performance of services, the
death benefit should itself be viewed as transferred on a daily
basis. Today's benefit owes its entire existence to today's
transfer of consideration by the employee and the current
agreement between employer and employee. The existence of
an identical agreement, or for that matter a totally different
agreement, accompanied by consideration five years earlier is
irrelevant to the current benefit. Under the continuous transfer
approach, every pure death benefit is transferred within three
years of death.131
128. 442 F.2d at 920. Neither court deciding Porter clarifies whether the con-
tinuation rule relates to the timing of the transfer or to the contemplation of
death requirement. Before the Tax Reform Act of 1976, LR.C. § 2035 required
both a transfer within three years of death and a transfer in contemplation of
death. In a later case the Tax Court indicated that the continuation argument
relates to when the transfer actually occurred. See Estate of Kopperman v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1849-24, 1849-29 (1978).
129. While the new benefit provided for a somewhat larger total payment, it
stretched out the payments over a ten year period. Under the prior agreement
all payments would be made within three years. Using the six percent discount
factor required by the regulations, see Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10(f) (1970), the
present value of the prior benefit for estate tax purposes might well exceed the
present value of the new benefit.
130. For example, assume that a $25,000 death benefit had been in effect for
five years, but one year before the employee's death the employer agreed to
raise the benefit to $50,000. Under the continuum approach, a right to the sec-
ond $25,000 benefit was arguably transferred within three years of death, but
the right to the first $25,000 was transferred at an earlier date.
131. The case for the continuous transfer theory is somewhat weaker if the
pure death benefit cannot be modified without the beneficiary's consent. This
kind of benefit is probably rare, but it is possible to arrange. See note 157 infra.
Under such an arrangement, the employee does not continually transfer the
right to benefit, but merely maintains a previously transferred right now owned
by someone else. The underlying rationale of LR.C. § 2035--to prevent the de-
cedent from diminishing the gross estate by making transfers close to death-
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The possibility of describing a section 2035 transfer under
either the continuum theory or the continuous transfer theory
is not limited to the employer-provided death benefit. A choice
between the two theories must also be made in connection with
employer-provided group term life insurance, a benefit strik-
ingly similar to the pure death benefit.132 The Service's present
position, announced in Revenue Ruling 71-497133 and supported
in a number of cases,134 is that the proceeds of life insurance
policies assigned more than three years before the insured's
death are not includable under section 2035, even if the insured
continues to pay the premiums.135 Neither the Service's rulings
nor the cases dealing with assignments more than three years
provides support for this characterization. The deceased employee could not
have acquired the death benefit, at least not without the beneficiary's consent.
The employee could only maintain the beneficiary's right by furnishing the con-
sideration represented by his services. Thus, the cost of purchasing the benefit
from the employer, rather than the cost of the benefit itself, is continuously
transferred within three years of death. This cost in theory amounts to the ad-
ditional salary the employer would have been willing to pay in lieu of providing
the death benefit plan, and equals the employer's actuarially determined cost
of providing the benefit.
The argument that, in the case of the non-modifiable death benefit, the em-
ployee is merely maintaining a previously transferred right is weakened, how-
ever, by the beneficiary's inability to maintain the benefit if the employee fails
to do so. Thus the employee is doing more than merely substituting his consid-
eration for that of the beneficiary; the employee, and the employee alone, by
continuing to work and thereby furnishing the necessary consideration, en-
ables the beneficiary to receive the benefit. But this argument addresses LR.C.
§ 2038 rather than section 2035. See text accompanying notes 148-56 infra.
Under section 2035, the issue is whether a transfer within three years of death
diminishes the decedent's gross estate by the amount of the benefit.
132. See notes 109-10 supra and accompanying text.
133. 1971-2 C.B. 329.
134. See, e.g., Estate of Silverman v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d 574, 576 (2d Cir.
1975); First Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. United States, 488 F.2d 575, 578 n.3 (9th Cir.
1973); Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 964, 966 (6th Cir. 1972).
135. In 1967, the Service took the position that the payment of premiums by
the insured, made within three years of death on policies previously trans-
ferred, was a transfer of an interest in the policy itself, measured by the pro-
portion of the premiums paid within the three year period to the total
premiums paid. Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 C.B. 327. This same proportion of the
insurance proceeds was included in the insured's gross estate under I.R.C.
§ 2035. In essence, the Service viewed the premium payment much like an im-
provement to property previously transferred. The courts uniformly rejected
this approach. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Midland v. United States, 423 F.2d
1286, 1288 (5th Cir. 1970); Estate of Coleman v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 921, 923-24
(1969). See also Kahn & Waggoner, supra note 108, at 951. The courts reasoned
that the premium payment merely maintained rights belonging to others, rights
that "were thus neither transferred nor transferrable by the decedent" within
three years of death. First Nat'l Bank of Midland v. United States, 423 F.2d at
1288. After its failure to win judicial support, the Service revoked its 1967 ruling
and announced its current policy in Rev. Rul 71-497, 1971-2 C.B. 329.
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before death considered, however, assignments of group term
life insurance.
Revenue Ruling 71-497 also considered the transfer of a
one-year term policy purchased by a decedent nine months
before death. When the decedent purchased the policy, he des-
ignated his children as the owners and beneficiaries of the pol-
icy. Relying on language in Chase,136 the ruling held that all of
the proceeds were includable in the insured's gross estate
under section 2035. This position was sustained in Bel v. United
States.l3 7 In Bel, the decedent had purchased, for four succes-
sive years, a one-year accidental death policy on his own life
and made his three children the owners. The insured died less
than ten months after the last purchase. The Fifth Circuit held
that the last purchase constituted a "transfer" of the accidental
death policy within the meaning of section 2035 and the pro-
ceeds were therefore included in the decedent's gross estate.138
The Bel court's holding implies that although the children's
right to the policy proceeds existed for more than three years
before the insured's death, it was not a continuously existing
right. The purchases instead represented a series of separate
annual "transfers" of the right. At the end of each one-year
term, an old right expired and a new right was created, notwith-
standing the absence of any lapse or modification in coverage.
The assignment of group-term life insurance can similarly
be characterized as the legal basis for a series of separate an-
nual transfers of policy rights at each renewal of the policy by
the employer.139 If the employer is not contractually obligated
to maintain the group insurance contract, the yearly decision
by the employer to renew the group contract seems analogous
to the yearly decision by the insured in Bel to purchase a new
one-year policy. The crucial factor in both situations is the in-
ability of the assignee of the policy to continue the policy. Ab-
sent the right of continuation, the assignee has a right that
annually expires.140
136. See text accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
137. 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972).
138. Id. at 692.
139. But in a recent IRS Technical Advice Memorandum, the Service held,
without any serious discussion, that the yearly renewal of a group term policy
by an employer was not a "new transfer of insurance coverage under section
2035." LTR 8034017, National Office Technical Advice Memorandum, May 9,
1980, reprinted in IRS Letter Ruling No. 183, Sept. 3, 1980 (CCH).
140. If however, the assignee has the right of continuation, the employer's
premium payments would constitute a maintenance expense of a continuously
existing right rather than the transfer of a new property right. Commentators
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An employer's decision to change insurance carriers of ex-
isting term policies illustrates an additional defect in the Serv-
ice's continuum theory as set forth in Revenue Ruling 71-497.
Assume an employer has provided a group term life insurance
policy to its employees, and that an employee assigns all rights
under the policy to his or her spouse more than three years
before his or her death. Under the general rule of Revenue
Ruling 71-497, the proceeds of the policy are not included in the
insured's gross estate because the transfer took place more
than three years before death. But suppose within three years
of the employee's death, the employer terminates its then cur-
rent insurance arrangement and obtains a similar arrangement
with a different insurer, and the insured assigns the new policy
to the spouse. Are the policy proceeds includable in the in-
sured's gross estate as a transfer within three years of death
under section 2035?
On these facts, the Service initially held in Revenue Ruling
79-231141 that the proceeds were includable under section 2035,
notwithstanding the decedent's previous assignment of the
rights under any arrangement for life insurance coverage pro-
vided by the employer. Without citing any direct authority, the
Service announced the general theory that a binding promise
to transfer property becomes a transfer for section 2035 pur-
poses at the time the promise becomes "enforceable and sus-
ceptible of valuation."' 42 The Service reasoned that the
assignment of future policies was not effective as a present
transfer of any rights, but rather was a contract to assign that
could become enforceable if and when a new policy were
have recently recognized the crucial role played by the right of continuation
component of a life insurance policy in applying LR.C. § 2035 to policy assign-
ments. See Kahn & Waggoner, supra note 108, at 977. Although Professors
Kahn and Waggoner do not discuss the special problem of group life insurance,
they do accept the notion that life insurance coverage can be treated as "a con-
tinuum and not as a collection of a number of contractual arrangements" only
if the right of continuation component has been assigned. Id. at 979.
141. 1979-2 C.B. 323.
142. Id. at 324. As indirect authority for this rule, the Service first noted the
existence of a parallel rule for gift tax purposes. Id. In a number of rulings, the
Service has held that a binding promise to transfer property is subject to a gift
tax on the date the promise to make the future transfer becomes enforceable
and susceptible of valuation, rather than when the promise is made or when
actual transfer of ownership occurs. See Rev. Rul. 75-71, 1975-1 C.B. 309; Rev.
Rul. 69-347, 1969-1 C.B. 227; Rev. Rul. 69-346, 1969-1 C.B. 227. Without any further
elaboration, the Service concluded that the same rule applies with equal force
to I.R.C. § 2035, "since the estate and gift tax provisions are in pari matenia and
must be construed together." Rev. Rul. 79-231, 1979-2 C.B. 323, 324. The pur-
ported gift tax rule is itself somewhat questionable. See notes 216-27 infra and
accompanying text.
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acquired.143
Revenue Ruling 79-231 threatened to disrupt the estate
plans of numerous employees who had transferred their group
term insurance policies in an effort to reduce their taxable es-
tates. A decision by an employer to select a new insurance
company, perhaps to achieve premium reductions or improve-
ments in service, would start the three-year clock running
anew. The Service subsequently revoked the ruling in Revenue
Ruling 80-298.144
In Revenue Ruling 80-289, the Service did not retreat from
any of the general theories it had put forth in the prior ruling;
indeed, it reiterated its view that the original assignment of the
policy "was not technically effective as a present transfer of the
decedent's rights"145 in future policies. Nevertheless, the ruling
concluded with the Service's statement that because the new
group term life insurance arrangement was "identical in all rel-
evant aspects to the previous arrangement," the date of the
original assignment should control. 46
Revenue Ruling 80-289 represents an adoption by the Serv-
ice of the continuum theory in the group term life insurance
context. This approach raises the same problems as in the case
of the pure death benefit discussed above.147 For example, how
much change in the policy will be tolerated before the new pol-
icy constitutes a new transfer? Is a change in the policy benefit
from two times annual salary to three times annual salary a
new transfer? If so, is it a transfer of just the excess benefits,
or of the whole value of the policy?
The continuous transfer model, on the other hand, provides
a sounder analytical basis for applying section 2035 to group
term life insurance. Moreover, the Service is obviously uncom-
fortable, as evidenced by its revocation of Revenue Ruling 79-
231, with drawing a distinction between the renewal of an ex-
isting group term policy and the purchase of a new identical
policy. Although the Service's discomfort is wholly justified,
the relief provided by Revenue Ruling 80-289 is inappropriate.
The better view finds even the renewal of a policy by the em-
ployer a transfer under section 2035. At the end of a group life
insurance policy's term, the employer has the option of re-
newing the existing policy, discontinuing the policy and substi-
143. Rev. Rul. 79-231, 1979-2 C.B. at 324.
144. 1980-2 C.B. 270.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tuting another, or discontinuing the policy and making no
substitution. The selection of the course of action is in essence
a renegotiation of the employee's contract. As in the case of
the pure death benefit, the assignee of the life insurance policy
has merely a right that periodically expires, rather than a right
continuously in existence.
2. Section 2038
Section 2038(a) (1)148 includes in a decedent's gross estate
any property interest transferred by the decedent, but which
remains, at the date of the decedent's death, subject to the de-
cedent's power, either alone or in conjunction with any other
person, to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the enjoyment of
the property interest. It is now well established that the trans-
fer requirement of section 2038 (a) (1) is satisfied if an employer
provides a death benefit in return for an employee's services.149
The more troublesome issue has been the degree of power a
deceased employee must have retained over the benefit in or-
der to bring it within the reach of section 2038(a) (1).
Although an employee's power to change the beneficiary of
the death benefit clearly triggers section 2038(a) (1),150 an em-
ployee may also be able to indirectly affect the beneficiary's in-
terest in the benefit without expressly retaining the right to
alter the beneficiary. For example, the employee always re-
tains the power to "terminate"' 5 ' the enjoyment of the death
benefit by leaving his or her job. The courts, however, have re-
jected the Commissioner's attempts to include such a power
under the ambit of section 2038(a) (1).152 Other indirect con-
148. I.R.C. § 2038(a) (1) provides:
(a) In General.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property-(1) Transfers after June 22, 1936.-To the extent of any
interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer
(except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, where the en-
joyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change
through the exercise of a power (in whatever capacity exercisable) by
the decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any other
person (without regard to when or from what source the decedent ac-
quired such power), to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any
such power is relinquished during the 3-year period ending on the date
of the decedent's death.
149. See Estate of Tully v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 1401, 1404 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
Estate of Siegel v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 613, 625 (1980); Rev. Rul. 76-304, 1976-2
C.E. 269. See also notes 78-92 supra and accompanying text.
150. Rev. Rul. 76-304, 1976-2 C.B. 269.
151. LR.C. §2038(a)(1).
152. See Estate of Tully v. United States, 528 F.2d 1401, 1405 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
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trols over death benefits, such as the power to divorce one's
spouse, where the death benefit is payable to the spouse, or the
power to accept a lower salary, where the death benefit is
pegged to the salary, have been held not to be section
2038(a) (1) powers. 153
The courts are warranted in excepting these last two pow-
ers from the scope of section 2038. Changing a spouse or hav-
ing children are acts of independent significance that are
unlikely to be undertaken for purposes of transfer tax manipu-
lation.154 At least one commentator has joined the Commis-
sioner in suggesting that changing employment is in the same
category.155 There is, however, a significant distinction for
transfer tax purposes between a decision to work and a deci-
sion to marry or procreate. The act of working is an act of
wealth creation. The pure death benefit is a part of the com-
pensation package and represents a deliberate incentive to ex-
ercise the power in question, namely to continue employment.
Although it is not the only such incentive, the relative level of
incentive is not the significant factor. An individual works for
compensation, and the decision to work or not to work repre-
sents control over the entire compensation package. Further-
more, the death benefit might be a significant factor in the
decision to continue employment if, for instance, the employee
has become uninsurable. Thus, the conclusion is incorrect that
the power to terminate a death benefit by changing jobs falls
outside the scope of section 2038 (a) (1).156
Estate of Whitworth v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 177, 180-81 (1963). See
also Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
The Commissioner now appears to accept this view. See Rev. Rul. 80-255,
1980-2 CE. 272.
153. Estate of Tully v. United States, 528 F.2d 1401, 1405-06 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
154. See Rev. Rul. 80-255, 1980-2 C.B. 272 (trust provision including settlor's
afterborn and after-adopted children as beneficiaries is not equivalent to set-
tlor's retention of power to alter beneficial interests within the meaning of
I.R.C. §§ 2038(a) (1) and 2036(a) (2)).
155. See Dodge, Retentions, Receipts, Transfers, and Accumulations of In-
come and Income Rights: Ruminations on the Post-Byrum Role of Estate Tax
Sections 2036, 2037, 2039, and 2043(a), 58 TEx. L. REv. 1, 31 (1979).
156. Employer-provided life insurance which terminates if the employee
ceases employment raises a similar issue. Although the Service has not argued
this position under LR.C. § 2038, it did at one time assert that the power to ter-
minate the policy by terminating employment was an "incident of ownership"
under I.R.C. § 2042(2). Rev. Rul 69-54, 1969-1 C.B. 221, 222. After the Court of
Claims rejected this position, see Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461, 469 (Ct.
CL. 1969), the Service acknowledged that "[a]n insured's power to cancel his in-
surance coverage by terminating his employment is a collateral consequence of
the power that every employee has to terminate his employment", and there-
fore was not an incident of ownership in the policy. Rev. Rul. 72-307, 1972-1 C.B.
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The power to renegotiate the terms of the death benefit
presents a somewhat different issue. The employer and the
employee might have expressly reserved such a power, or it
might exist as a matter of local contract law.157 It is well estab-
lished that section 2038 reaches powers held by a decedent
which are exercisable only in conjunction with another person,
whether or not the other person has an adverse interest in the
307, 308, modifying Situation 1 in Rev. Rul. 69-54, 1969-1 C.B. 221, 222. The Serv-
ice's current position is unfortunate for the reasons noted in the accompanying
text.
157. A death benefit cannot be modified without the consent of the benefici-
ary if the agreement creating the benefit so provides. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 142(1) (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). The more difficult
problem is whether an agreement that is silent as to the right of the employer
and employee to modify the death benefit nevertheless creates an obligation to
pay the death benefit that cannot be varied without the beneficiary's consent.
Under the original Restatement the duty of a promisor to a third party benefici-
ary cannot be affected by any agreement between the pronisee and the prom-
isor, unless the power to do so is reserved. RESTATMENT OF CONTRACTS § 142
(1932). Under the Restatement (Second), in the absence of a term precluding
modification, the promisor and promisee retain the power to modify the duty
by subsequent agreement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 142(2)
(Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). The power to modify, however, "terminates when
the beneficiary, before he receives notification of the discharge or modification,
materially changes his position in justifiable reliance on the promise, or brings
suit on it, or manifests assent to it at the request of the promisor or promisee."
Id. § 142(3). The Restatement (Second) appears to represent the majority rule.
See Spates v. Spates, 267 Md. 72, 78, 296 A.2d 581, 584 (1972).
Rhodes v. Rhodes, 266 S.W.2d 790 (Ky. 1953), apparently is the only case to
consider the issue of the power to modify an employee death benefit. In
Rhodes, an employment contract provided for annuity payments to the son of
an employee if the employee died while employed and before reaching age 65.
The employee divorced, remarried, and entered into a new employment con-
tract in which his new wife was named the beneficiary of the annuity instead of
the son. The court held that since the right to rescind the contract was not re-
served in the contract, the employer and employee had no power to alter the
rights of the son after the son had accepted the contract. Id. at 792-93. Because
the son was an infant, his assent was presumed. Id. at 792.
The result in Rhodes is questionable. The comments to the Restatement
(Second) suggest that "[t]he true test rests not on fictitious assent but on the
manifested intention of the original parties; other circumstances, such as the
fact that the consideration for the promise is executory, may rebut the infer-
ence that the beneficiary's right is irrevocable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 142, Comment d (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). Some cases have
expressly held that a beneficiary's rights under an executory contract can be
modified, even if the beneficiary is an infant. See, e.g., Lehman v. Stout, 261
Minn. 384, 392-94, 112 N.W.2d 640, 646-47 (1961). Although Lehman did not in-
volve a death benefit, its approach is directly contrary to Rhodes. The contract
in Rhodes was executory, since the employee had to be employed at the time of
his death in order for the employer to be obligated to pay the benefit. It should
be noted that the Restatement (Second) includes illustrations in its comments
based on both the Rhodes and Lehman cases, without attempting to reconcile
them. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 142, Comment d, il-
lustration 3 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973) with id. illustration 4.
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property.1 5 8 It would seem, therefore, that a power of negotia-
tion, whether arising under a contract or implied by law, is suf-
ficient to require inclusion of the death benefit under section
2038(a) (1). In Estate of Tully v. United States,'5 9 however, the
Court of Claims held that Congress did not intend section
2038 (a) (1) to extend to the mere possibility that an employer
and employee might modify the contractual death benefit.160
The decedent in Tully owned half the stock of a closely
held corporation. Decedent entered into a contract with the
corporation whereby his wife was to receive as a death benefit
an amount equal to double her husband's salary for the year
immediately preceding his death. The contract was later
amended to limit the maximum amount of the death benefit.
The original agreement did not include an expressly reserved
right to modify the death benefit,161 and as the court noted,
Tully's stock ownership was insufficient to compel modification
of the agreement. 62 The court therefore concluded that Tully
possessed merely "powers of persuasion"' 63 that fell short of
the power contemplated by section 2038 (a) (1), and that the
death benefit was accordingly excluded from the gross estate.
This conclusion is incorrect for two reasons. First, the
court's argument that section 2038(a) (1) does not extend to
"powers of persuasion" is unconvincing. The court apparently
viewed the power to renegotiate as an incidental power. But,
unlike the incidental powers noted above, 6 4 an employee can
use this power to directly affect the beneficiary's interest; the
employee, for example, could agree with the employer to
change the beneficiary from the employee's spouse to the em-
ployee's children. This power is no more speculative than a
power held by a grantor of a trust to change the remainderman
with the consent of the trustee, and should be within the reach
of section 2038(a)(1).165 The employee's power is even less
158. See Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85, 91 (1935);
Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (1962).
159. 528 F.2d 1401 (Ct. CL 1976). A similar result was reached in Kramer v.
United States, 406 F.2d 1363, 1369 (Ct. CL 1969).
160. 528 F.2d at 1405.
161. Id. at 1404.
162. Id.
163. Id. (emphasis omitted).
164. See text accompanying note 153 supra.
165. Nevertheless, in the typical trust situation, a mere power of persuasion
is not an I.R.C. § 2038 power. Thus, a grantor of a trust who has granted dispos-
itive powers to a sole trustee does not jointly hold the power merely because
he might persuade the trustee to act in a certain way. A contrary result would
render every irrevocable trust subject to section 2038 and is clearly beyond
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speculative, since a trustee may have no incentive to accommo-
date the grantor, but an employer usually has every incentive
to accommodate an employee, especially when it costs the em-
ployer nothing.
The court also reasoned that if the mere possibility of bilat-
eral contract modification were within the reach of section
2038 (a) (1), "it would sweep all employee death benefit plans
into the gross estates of employees."l 66 This conclusion is in-
correct, since there are some benefits that cannot be revoked or
modified without the consent of the beneficiary.167 Moreover,
even assuming that section 2038 would reach the majority of
pure death benefits, the court does not explain why this result
would contravene tax policy. Indeed, tax policy suggests that a
pure death benefit which can be bargained away in the renego-
tiation of an employee's fringe benefit package is still within
the control of the employee, and represents a substitute for a
testamentary transfer.
A recent Tax Court case has further called into question
the Tully court's interpretation of section 2038. In Estate of
Siegel v. Commissioner,168 the Tax Court held that an ex-
pressly reserved power of bilateral contract modification justi-
fies inclusion of the pure death benefit under section
2038(a) (1).169 The Tax Court purported to distinguish Tully on
Congress's intent. But if the grantor and the trustee share the dispositive
power, section 2038 cannot be avoided. Similarly, if the employer and employee
by agreement may alter the beneficiary's rights under the death benefit agree-
ment, section 2038 should also be applicable.
166. 528 F.2d at 1405.
167. See note 157 supra. It might be argued that even in the case of the "ir-
revocable" death benefit, the beneficiary could consent to a modification and
thus the employee retains an I.R.C. § 2038 power to modify held in conjunction
with the employer and the beneficiary. This argument is properly foreclosed by
the holding in Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U.S. 93 (1935), that a grantor's power
under local trust law to revoke a trust only with the consent of all the benefi-
ciaries was outside the scope of the predecessor to section 2038(a)(1). The
Treasury Regulations now embody the Helmholz rule that "section 2038 does
not apply ... (2) If the decedent's power could be exercised only with the con-
sent of all parties having an interest (vested or contingent) in the transferred
property, and if the power adds nothing to the rights of the parties under local
law.. . ." Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (1958). This rule is correct, since a contrary
rule would make section 2038 applicable to almost all irrevocable trusts, a re-
sult certainly beyond Congress's intent. This kind of power is simply too inci-
dental to warrant including the subject property in the decedent's gross estate.
168. 74 T.C. 613 (1980).
169. In Siegel, the employee entered into an employment agreement with
the employer that provided for the continuation, for a limited period of time, of
the employee's salary to his children in the event of the employee's death. The
agreement contained the following statement: "No right or interest is hereby
granted to the children of SIEGEL except as set forth herein and such rights or
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the basis that the case did not involve an express reservation of
a power to modify.l1O The estate maintained, however, that
Tully was nevertheless on point because, under local contract
law, the parties to a contract may always renegotiate the terms
of their contract, and the reserved power added nothing to the
rights already possessed by the employee.'?'
The Tax Court rebutted this argument by examining the
common law power of employer and employee to modify the
beneficiaries' rights in the absence of an expressly reserved
right to do so. Finding no controlling state law on point, the
court looked to the original Restatement of Contracts and Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts for assistance. 7 2 Under sec-
tion 142 of the original Restatement,7 3 a third party donee
beneficiary acquires an indefeasible right to performance of the
contract unless the power to modify the contract is expressly
reserved in specific terms. 74 Under section 142 of the Restate-
ment (Second),175 the rule is more limited. In the absence of
an agreement precluding variation of a duty to a beneficiary,
the promisor and promisee retain the power to discharge or
modify the duty by a subsequent agreement until the benefici-
ary materially changes his or her position in justifiable reliance
on the promise, brings suit on it, or manifests assent at the re-
quest of the promisor or promisee.176 The Tax Court concluded
that, whichever rule is applied, by expressly reserving the
power to modify the rights of the beneficiaries, the employer
and employee had greater rights than they possessed under lo-
cal law.l77
Siegel correctly concluded that an expressly reserved right
of modification is a section 2038 power. By distinguishing Tully,
Siegel might also be read to imply that if the employer and em-
ployee had not expressly reserved the right to modify the death
benefit, then any rights to modify arising under local law would
not be sufficient to include the benefit under section 2038. This
interests are subject to any modification of this agreement by the mutual con-
sent of SIEGEL and the CORPORATION." Id. at 616.
170. Id. at 627. See also Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363 (Ct. CL
1969).
171. 74 T.C. at 627.
172. 74 T.C. at 629.
173. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 142 (1932).
174. See note 157 supra.
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 142 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7,
1973). See note 157 supra.
176. Id.
177. 74 T.C. at 629.
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implication is incorrect and contrary to authority.178 Because
an employer and employee could clearly create a duty to a ben-
eficiary that could not be varied without the beneficiary's con-
sent, 7 9 it is irrelevant whether they fail to do so by expressly
reserving the power to modify or rely on a state law rule. The
crucial point about both expressly reserved and common law
rights of contract modification is that the employee retains suf-
ficient control over the transferred property to warrant inclu-
sion under section 2038.180 Properly understood, Siegel
supports the extension of the scope of section 2038(a) (1) to
reach any death benefit over which the employee, in conjunc-
tion with the employer, retains a right of modification, regard-
less of whether that right is express or implied by law.
Siegel therefore provides the Service with new ammunition
in its protracted struggle to subject nonqualified employee
death benefits to transfer taxation. Whether other courts will
follow or even extend the reach of Siegel is uncertain, but the
opinion is a first step toward judicial recognition that the rea-
soning in Tully is flawed.
3. Section 2037
The Service has successfully relied upon section 2037181 to
178. The Tax Court itself has held that a grantor's power to revoke a trust
suffices to require inclusion under I.R.C. § 2038, even though the contract con-
tains no express reservation of such a power by the grantor and the power
arises solely by operation of state law. See Estate of Casey v. Commissioner, 55
T.C. 737, 743 (1971); Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 361, 368 (1968). In
addition, other estate tax provisions have been held to reach interests or pow-
ers retained by operation of law. See Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335
U.S. 701 (1949) (interpreting section 811 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939).
In Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'g, Estate of
Castleberry v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 682 (1977), the majority of the Fifth Cir-
cuit panel attempted to distinguish Spiegel as its reasoning would be applied to
I.R.C. § 2036, at least where the retained interest was "created solely by opera-
tion of law as the unavoidable result of what was in form and within the intend-
ment of the parties the most complete conveyance possible ..... " Id. at 1294.
Judge Roney dissented from this portion of the opinion, however, noting that
"the tax consequences should be the same whether [the] interest was retained
by the express provisions of [the] donative instruments, or arose by operation
of law... ." Id. at 1296 (Roney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
For a criticism of Wyly, see Dodge, supra note 155, at 38.
179. See note 157 upra.
180. Section 2038 provides even stronger textual support for this position
than the other estate provisions since it expressly includes a power to change
enjoyment "without regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired
such power." I.R.C. § 2038 (a) (1).
181. LR.C. § 2037(a) provides:
(a) General Rule.-The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the
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include pure death benefits in the estate of a deceased em-
ployee,182 but its reach can easily be avoided. Under section
2037, property transferred during life by a decedent will be in-
cluded in the decedent's gross estate if possession or enjoy-
ment of the property, through ownership of the transferred
interest, can be obtained only by surviving the decedent and
the decedent has retained a reversionary interest in the prop-
erty that immediately before the decedent's death exceeds five
percent of the property's value. As in the case of the other life-
time transfer provisions, the courts properly view the making
of a contract with the employer as a transfer of a property in-
terest to the beneficiary. 8 3
Since the pure death benefit will be paid only if and when
the employee dies, the survivorship requirement of section 2037
is automatically satisfied. By drafting the agreement so that
the deceased employee does not possess any reversionary in-
terest in the benefit, however, the arrangement can avoid the
reversion requirement of section 2037. The drafter could ac-
complish this result by making the death benefit payable to
various classes of the employee's relatives, such as a spouse,
children, or issue, while providing that if no beneficiaries sur-
vived the benefit would not be paid. Since neither the em-
ployee or the employee's estate could receive the payments,
section 2037 would not apply.184
decedent has at any time after September 7, 1916, made a transfer (ex-
cept in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, if-
(1) possession or enjoyment of the property can, through owner-
ship of such interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent, and
(2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest in the prop-
erty (but in the case of a transfer made before October 8, 1949, only if
such reversionary interest arose by the express terms of the instru-
ment of transfer), and the value of such reversionary interest immedi-
ately before the death of the decedent exceeds 5 percent of the value of
such property.
182. See Estate of Bogley v. United States, 514 F.2d 1027 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Es-
tate of Fried v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 805 (1970), affid 445 F.2d 979 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972). See also Worthen v. United States, 192
F. Supp. 727 (D. Mass. 1961) (interpreting section 811(c) (3) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1939); Rev. Rul. 78-15, 1978-1 C.B. 289.
183. See Worthen v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 727, 733-34 (D. Mass. 1961);
Estate of Bogley v. United States, 514 F.2d 1027, 1039 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
184. Careless drafting can be fatal to any attempt to avoid LR.C. § 2037. In
Estate of Bogley v. United States, 514 F.2d 1027, 1039 (Ct. CL 1975), the corpo-
rate resolution establishing the death benefit provided that "the surviving
widow or estate is to receive two years' salary .... ." The question the court
had to face was whose estate, the widow's or the employee's, would be entitled
to the death benefit had the widow not survived. If it were the widow's estate,
section 2037 would not have applied for lack of a reversionary interest in the
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Il. GIFT TAX ASPECTS
The Service has devoted much effort in attempts to include
the pure death benefit in the deceased employee's gross estate,
but as noted above, these efforts have generally been unsuc-
cessful. The cases, however, have established that, for estate
tax purposes, a transfer by an employee can take place if, in
consideration of an employee's services, the employer agrees to
pay a death benefit.185 Several courts have actually referred to
the transfer as a gift.186 The gift tax issue thus arises naturally
from the estate tax treatment of such benefits.
A number of troublesome issues of valuation and timing
arise in determining the application of the gift tax to pure
death benefits. As a preliminary matter, it seems clear that
there is no completed gift if the employee has the power to al-
ter the beneficiary designation once it is made. 8 7 As noted
above, however, such a power would result in the inclusion of
the benefit in the employee's gross estate under section 2038.188
On the other hand, if an employee has an unqualified right to
receive an annuity, but elects to take a reduced annuity in re-
turn for a death benefit payable to an irrevocably designated
beneficiary, the regulations provide that the employee makes a
completed gift at the time the election and designation become
irrevocable.189
A number of factors may cause the typical pure death ben-
efit to fall somewhere between these two extremes. The benefit
may be subject to forfeiture should the employee leave employ-
ment;190 the amount of the benefit may be variable, such as
amounts tied to the employee's salary at death; the benefit may
be payable only to certain qualifying beneficiaries and if there
are none, no benefit is payable;191 or, finally, the benefit may be
modified or discontinued through renegotiation of the em-
ployee's benefit package.
decedent. The court concluded that it was the employee's estate, and included
the benefit in the employee's gross estate. Id.
185. See note 78 supra.
186. See, e.g., note 9 supra.
187. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1958).
188. See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
189. Treas. Reg. § 25.2517-1(a) (1972); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (10) (1958).
The value of the gift can be calculated using the discount rate and mortality
assumptions set forth in the Regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-9(a) & (e)
(1970).
190. See text accompanying notes 117-18 supra.
191. An example would be a benefit payable only to an employee's surviv-
ing spouse. If the employee is not married, no benefit would be payable.
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It is possible to construct at least three general theories for
the gift taxation of the pure death benefit: the single gift at cre-
ation theory; the continuous gift theory; and the completed gift
at death theory. The remainder of this section discusses these
possibilities.
A. SINGLE GnFT AT CREATION
The beneficiary's right to the pure death benefit can be
characterized as a single gift occurring at the time the contract
creating the benefit is made. This characterization is consistent
with the courts' conclusion that the relevant transfer for estate
tax purposes takes place at that time.192 Nevertheless, it is well
established that a gift is not complete for gift tax purposes if
the transferor retains a power to alter the disposition of the
property,193 and the employee's ability to terminate the benefit
by ceasing employment would seem to render the gift incom-
plete in any meaningful sense.194 Moreover, the gift is also in-
complete if the employee and employer acting together can
modify or terminate the benefit.195
Even if the beneficiary's right to receive the pure death
benefit were treated as a taxable gift, the characterization of
the death benefit as a single transfer would cause it to be
grossly undervalued, because at the time the contract creating
the benefit is made the gift has only nominal value. 9 6 Obvi-
ously no market exists for such benefits, and any purely actua-
192. See Estate of Porter v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 915, 919 (1st Cir. 1971);
Estate of Kopperman v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1849-24, -30 (1978). See
also Estate of Tully v. United States, 528 F.2d 1401, 1404 (Ct. Cl. 1976). For a
criticism of this approach, see notes 123-30 supra and accompanying text.
193. See Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939); Camp v. Commis-
sioner, 195 F.2d 999, 1003 (1st Cir. 1952); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1958).
194. The argument that the gift of the pure death benefit is incomplete par-
allels the discussion above concerning IR.C. § 2038. See notes 148-80 supra and
accompanying text. There it was asserted that the power to terminate the ben-
efit by ceasing employment and the power to renegotiate the benefit were both
sufficient to trigger the applicability of section 2038 to the death benefit. Since
the courts, with the exception of Siegel v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 613 (1980),
have rejected this interpretation of the term "power" in section 2038, see notes
158-80 supra and accompanying text, such powers may also be found insuffi-
cient to prevent the gift from being complete for gift tax purposes.
195. Although the employee acting alone may not be able to change the
benefit, for gift tax purposes a donor possesses a power of modification or revo-
cation if it is exercisable in conjunction with any person not having a "substan-
tial adverse interest" in the transferred property. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(e)
(1958). See also Camp v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 999 (1st Cir. 1952). An em-
ployer has no adverse financial interest in the selection of a new beneficiary
and certainly would not be adverse to eliminating the death benefit entirely.
196. See text accompanying note 191 supra.
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rial value would have to be heavily discounted under any
reasonable application of the general willing buyer-willing
seller' 97 standard of valuation. The pure death benefit would
virtually escape transfer taxation if this approach were
adopted, and the courts could not be convinced to reconsider
their estate tax analysis.
This result would clearly be inappropriate. The employee
has negotiated a benefit that is in essence a salary substitute.
Had the benefit not been created, the employee presumably
would have been paid additional salary which would have en-
hanced his estate and been subject to taxation. The single gift
at creation approach, therefore, represents an inadequate re-
sponse to the gift taxation of pure death benefits.
B. CoNTmiNuous GIFr
In the alternative, the pure death benefit could be regarded
as a series of successive transfers in a manner analogous to the
Service's treatment of term life insurance. Revenue Ruling 76-
490198 expresses the Service's position on the gift tax aspects of
the transfer of a group term life insurance policy. Under the
facts of that ruling, an employee transferred all of his rights in
an employer-provided group term policy to an irrevocable trust.
The Service held that the initial transfer to the trust did not
constitute a taxable gift because the employee's interest in the
policy had no ascertainable value at the time of the transfer,
but concluded that each premium payment made by the em-
ployer was taxable as an indirect gift by the employee to the
assignee of the policy.199
In reaching this conclusion, the Service reasoned that the
initial transfer of the employee's rights in the term insurance
policy lacked an ascertainable value because the employer
could refuse to make further premium payments.2 00 The pure
death benefit presents the same valuation problem since the
benefit may be terminated by agreement between the employer
and employee. Even if the death benefit may not be withdrawn
without the consent of the beneficiary,201 the benefit still de-
pends on the employee's continued employment, a factor that
197. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (1958).
198. 1976-2 C.B. 300.
199. Id. at 301.
200. The ruling expressly stated that the employer had no contractual obli-
gation to the employee or the assignee to maintain the group contract. Id. at
300.
201. See note 157 supra.
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is hardly more predictable than continued employer premium
payments.
The second conclusion of Revenue Ruling 76-490, that taxa-
ble gifts occur as the employer pays the premiums, suggests
the possibility of a similar result in connection with death ben-
efits. The beneficiary's contractual right to the death benefits is
a valuable right, functionally equivalent to life insurance. Each
day the right exists the beneficiary receives an economic bene-
fit that could be treated as a gift.2 02 The employee is in effect
purchasing the benefit for the beneficiary by performing serv-
ices. Although it may seem odd to view the beneficiary as re-
202. The pure death benefit, of course, involves no premiums, but the bene-
ficiary still receives the economic benefit of equivalent insurance coverage.
One can therefore view the provision of this benefit during a given month as a
transfer of an amount equal to the monthly cost of providing term insurance
coverage equal to the death benefit. Cf. Treas Reg. § 1.79-3 (1979) (valuation of
employer provided group term life insurance for employee's income tax pur-
poses). The gift tax would then be assessed as of the end of each calendar year
based on the number of months of coverage. Although there is little direct au-
thority for this approach, the Court of Claims in Goldsmith v. United States, 586
F.2d 810 (Ct. Cl. 1978), held that the promise of an employer to pay a death ben-
efit to the children of an employee constituted a current economic benefit to
the employee taxable as income to the employee. The court focused on the
similarity between the death benefit and life insurance:
It becomes quite clear that the promises of payment on death or disa-
bility were the familiar undertakings of a life insurance company, al-
beit made by a hospital. To the extent of these promises, the deferred
compensation agreement provided the taxpayer with a current eco-
nomic benefit as valuable as comparable promises by a life insurance
company. Taxability is as plain as the taxability of an insurance pre-
mium paid by an employer, in other than a qualified pension or group
plan, on a policy of which the employee is beneficiary.
Id. at 821. As for the valuation problem, the court concluded that the value of
the economic benefits "is in principle easily accomplished with evidence of the
cost of comparable commercial insurance." Id. at 822. The case did not deal
with the estate or gift tax consequences of the agreement, but if the beneficiary
designation were irrevocable, it would seem that the economic benefit was
transferred to the beneficiary and subject to gift tax by analogy to an assigned
life insurance policy.
Whether other courts will follow Goldsmith, even as to the income tax is-
sue, is unclear. The agreement between the employer and the employee in
Goldsmith had some unique aspects. The parties expressly agreed to reduce
the employee's salary by an amount equivalent to the employer's cost of pro-
viding the death benefits (as well as retirement benefits provided by the agree-
ment). In addition, the employer actually funded the agreement by purchasing
a life insurance endowment policy, the premium for which exactly equaled the
salary reduction. The policy was, however, payable to the employer, not the
employee. Id. at 814-15.
In Centre v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 16 (1970), the Tax Court, with little dis-
cussion, declined to hold that the employee received an annual taxable benefit.
Id. at 19. In Centre the taxpayer urged earlier taxability while the Commis-
sioner argued taxability when the insurance policy owned by the employer was
assigned to the employee when he terminated employment.
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ceiving anything of value, since no money is received unless
the employee dies, the analysis is in principle no different than
the Service's treatment of life insurance.
Equating the value of the gift of the pure death benefit to
the cost 203 of equivalent life insurance coverage is not, how-
ever, consistent with established gift tax valuation principles.
The value of property for gift tax purposes is the price at which
such property would change hands between a willing buyer
and a willing seller.204 Thus, the value of the gift of a pure
203. Rev. Rul. 76-490, 1976-2 C.B. 300, ignores, however, a subtle valuation
problem. The Ruling assumes without any discussion that the value of the gift
is the amount of the premium paid by the employer. This amount, however, is
not necessarily equal to the economic benefit of the life insurance coverage.
For example, if the employee is in bad health and uninsurable at normal rates,
the value of the economic benefit of the coverage would be greater than the
premiums. By contrast, if the beneficiary actually owned a life insurance policy
on the employee's life and the employee paid one month's premiums, it would
be inappropriate to treat the gift as anything more than a gift of the actual pre-
miums. If the employee did not pay the premiums, the beneficiary could sim-
ply pay them and thereby obtain the enhanced benefit of the insurance
coverage. Thus the employee has not transferred the value of the month's in-
surance coverage in excess of the premiums paid; that value was already
owned by the beneficiary. The beneficiary of an assigned group term policy
stands in a very different position. If the employer decides to discontinue pay-
ing the premiums, the beneficiary does not have the right to pay them and re-
new the policy. Therefore, the employee's payment of the premiums on the
group term policy may provide the beneficiary with an economic benefit, in ex-
cess of the premiums, that would otherwise not be available.
But is this additional value properly subject to the gift tax? On the one
hand, this value does not reduce the employee's potential estate tax liability.
The employee is purchasing the policy with his services and, therefore, pre-
sumably foregoing additional salary equal to the employer's cost of providing
the policy. Thus, the employee's wealth is reduced only by the cost of the pol-
icy, not its value. On the other hand, under present gift tax law, many transfers
are taxable although there is no reduction in the wealth of the transferor at the
time of the transfer. For example, assume a donor has created an irrevocable
trust under which the donor reserved the right to determine whether the in-
come would be paid to A or B. If the trust income is $10,000 and the donor di-
rects that it be paid to A, there is a taxable gift to A of $10,000. See Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2511-2(f) (1958). Although the donor could not have obtained the money,
the donor's retained control over the transferred property justifies this result.
Nevertheless, the administrative difficulties raised by an individualized de-
termination of value based on the health of the employee argue against its im-
plementation. See Kahn & Waggoner, supra note 108, at 977-78. See also Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-6 (1963). The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that the in-
surability of an insured may affect the gift tax value of a policy. United States
v. Ryerson, 312 U.S. 260, 262 (1941). Cf. Estate of Pritchard v. Commissioner, 4
T.C. 204 (1944) (payment equal to cash surrender value of policy was not ade-
quate and full consideration for assignment of policy where insured was termi-
nally ill). Notwithstanding this authority, because any increase in value due to
poor health does not cause a reduction in the employee's potential estate, there
seems little reason not to rely on some kind of a uniform table for valuing the
insurance benefit.
204. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (1965).
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death benefit is equivalent to what an arm's length purchaser
would continually pay to possess the right to the benefit, with
the knowledge that the right might terminate at any time if the
employee ceases employment or renegotiates the benefit. This
value would certainly be far less than the monthly cost of
equivalent term life insurance. By contrast, if the insured be-
comes terminally ill during the period of coverage, the policy
cannot be snatched away, because the purchaser of term life
insurance buys coverage for a fixed period of time, usually with
the right of renewal without evidence of insurability. The value
of the right to a death benefit which can be terminated at
any time is therefore somewhat indeterminate. 20 The value
of equivalent term life insurance is, at best, a distant upper
bound.206
205. It should be emphasized that the terminability of a transferred right
does not necessarily imply a continuous transfer of only minimal value. For ex-
ample, assume that the employer and employee have agreed that the employer
will loan the employee's spouse $50,000 interest free as long as the employee
remains employed. The transaction is in substance an interest free loan to the
employee followed by a similar loan from the employee to the employee's
spouse. As a theoretical matter it seems clear that an interest free loan consti-
tutes a gift, although a number of courts have rejected this view. See Johnson
v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73, 77 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Crown v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 1060, 1062 (1977), nonacq., 1978-1 C.B. 2, aff'd, 585 F.2d 234, 240-41 (7th Cir.
1978). See generally Joyce & Del Cotto, Interest-Free Loans: The Odyssey of a
Misnomer, 35 TAx L. REV. 459, 495-99 (1980). The Service's view is that the right
to use property, in this case money, is itself an interest in property, the transfer
of which is subject to the gift tax. Rev. Rul 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
An interest-free demand loan cannot be valued at the time the loan is
made, however, because the borrower received the right to use money for an
indefinite period. The Service therefore concluded that the value of the gift
should be calculated at the end of each calendar quarter, based upon the value
of the use of the money during the calendar quarter, reasoning that a gift is not
completed unless and until the transfer becomes susceptible of valuation. Id.
at 409. The donor's power to revoke the loan provides an alternate rationale.
Complete transfers take place only as the donee is allowed the use of the
money. The employee can deprive the spouse of the right to the money by ei-
ther terminating employment or renegotiating with the employer.
The continuous gift of the interest free loan can be valued by reference to
what an arm's length borrower would continually pay for the use of the money,
knowing that it might have to be returned at any time. Since demand loans are
not uncommon, a suitable value should be ascertainable. The value would
presumably fluctuate, just as the interest rate on demand loans fluctuates.
206. Although this analysis appears to question the validity of the Service's
position in Rev. Rul 76-490, 1976-2 C.B. 300, regarding the taxability of em-
ployer-paid group life insurance premiums, this is not necessarily so. The ma-
jority of states require that group term policies permit an employee to convert
to an individual policy within thirty-one days of termination of employment.
See, e.g., CAL INS. CODE § 10209(b) (West 1972); MIcH. CoMP. LAws § 500.4438
(1967). See also FED. EST. & GIFT TAx REP. CCH 7020.051 (1977). Thus the em-
ployee cannot deprive the beneficiary of the right to continue the insurance
coverage merely by terminating employment. When the employer pays the
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This conclusion is consistent with the view that the em-
ployee has purchased the contractual promise of the death ben-
efit from the employer. 207 By analogy, if an employee
purchased a term life insurance policy, the mere existence of
the policy would confer only a minimal economic benefit on the
beneficiary because the employee might choose to discontinue
the coverage at some future date. Moreover, although the ben-
eficiary realizes some minimal economic benefit so long as the
policy continues in force, there has never been any attempt to
subject this continuing benefit to gift taxation. If the courts
and the Service are correct in concluding that the beneficiary
receives only a minimal economic benefit, what are the premi-
ums buying? The answer, of course, is that they are purchasing
an economic benefit for the owner of the policy. The parallel
between the life insurance policy and the death benefit would
be precise if the employee retained the right to alter the benefi-
ciary. The mere power, if it exists, to renegotiate the death
benefit, and the dependence of the benefit on the continuing
performance of services by the employee, justify analogous
treatment. The retained control amounts, in effect, to a reten-
tion of the economic benefits.
Thus, if one views the pure death benefit as a continuous
series of gifts, the rights transferred to the beneficiary are like
the rights of a beneficiary named in a policy owned by another
under which the beneficiary could be changed at any time. The
value of such rights, although probably greater than zero, is dif-
ficult to ascertain, and certainly less than the value of commer-
cial term insurance. Gift taxation, therefore, does not provide a
satisfactory alternative to taxation of the full amount of the
benefit under the estate tax. Apart from statutory change, how-
ever, if the courts reject the Service's completed gift at death
monthly premium, the beneficiary receives at least one month's coverage,
whether or not the employer decides to make premium payments in the future.
If the employer could cancel the policy at any time during the month, even
after the month's premiums were paid, the beneficiary's rights would be far
more fragile, and would raise the same valuation problem as the employee
death benefit. In some states, however, group-term policies must also provide a
limited right to convert the policy into an individual policy if the employer ter-
minates the group policy. Generally, such a conversion right applies only to
employees who have been covered for five or more years and the right is lim-
ited to the lesser of the decrease in group-term insurance coverage, taking into
account new policies purchased by the employer, or $2,000. See, e.g., N.Y. INs.
LAw § 161(e) (McKinney 1980 Supp.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 532.6 (Purdon
1971). To the extent the conversion right exists, the approach of Revenue Rul-
ing 76-490 is appropriate since the premium payments are in effect maintaining
a right to continue the policy which is possessed by the beneficiary.
207. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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theory, discussed below, 2 08 the continuous gift theory may be
the only means available to subject the pure death benefit to
wealth transfer taxation. In such event, the Service should con-
sider issuing a table setting forth a presumed monthly value for
each $1,000 of pure death benefit.
If the Service adopts the continuous gift theory, the availa-
bility of the $10,000 annual per donee gift exclusion209 will be
crucial. In order to qualify for the annual exclusion, the death
benefit must not constitute a "future interest."210 According to
the Service, a future interest does not include "such contrac-
tual rights as exist in a bond, note (though bearing no interest
until maturity), or in a policy of life insurance, the obligations
of which are to be discharged by payments in the future."211
Even term life insurance, which provides no current benefits
such as a cash surrender value, is viewed as a present inter-
est.2 12 A pure death benefit bears some resemblance to term
life insurance and certainly qualifies as a contract right.
Nevertheless, the Service has taken the position that the
election by an employee to take a reduced annuity in return for
a survivor annuity payable to a designated beneficiary is a gift
of a future interest.21 3 Since the payments under a survivor an-
nuity commence upon the death of the employee, from the ben-
eficiary's viewpoint, it is similar to a life insurance policy. The
beneficiary of a survivor annuity, however, differs from the
owner of a life insurance policy in one important respect. If the
beneficiary dies before the employee, the right to a survivor an-
nuity disappears, but a life insurance policy remains and be-
comes a part of the beneficiary's estate. In this respect a pure
death benefit which is payable to the beneficiary's estate if the
208. See notes 216-24 infra and accompanying text.
209. Effective for transfers made after December 31, 1981, section 2503(b)
provides an annual exclusion from the gift tax of $10,000 per donee for gifts of
present interests. LR.C. § 2503(b), as amended by, 1981 Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 441(a), 95 Stat. 172. Prior to the 1981 Act, the exclusion was only $3,000.
210. LR.C. § 2503(b). A future interest is one which is "limited to commence
in use, possession, or enjoyment at some future date or time." Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2503-3(a) (1958). Congress disqualified future interests from the $10,000 an-
nual exclusion because of the difficulty of valuing such interests and determin-
ing the identity of the ultimate donees. S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 41
(1932), reprinted in 1939-1, pt. 2, C.B. 496, 526. The fact that a donee may have
vested rights, see Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 20 (1945), in the prop-
erty or even an interest which can be sold, see Schuhmacher v. Commissioner,
8 T.C. 453, 462-64 (1947), acq. 1947-1 C.B. 4, Howze v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 1254,
1256-57 (1943), is not sufficient to create a present interest.
211. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503(a) (1958).
212. Rev. Rul. 55-408, 1955-1 C.B. 113.
213. Treas. Reg. § 25.2517-1(a)(1) (1961).
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beneficiary dies before the employee, more closely resembles
the life insurance policy than the survivor annuity. Such a ben-
efit may well qualify as a present interest.214 Many death bene-
fit plans, however, provide for contingent beneficiaries if the
primary beneficiary is deceased, or eliminate the benefit pay-
ment entirely if all the named beneficiaries are deceased.
Since under such an arrangement every beneficiary's right to
the death benefit is contingent on surviving the employee, it
would seem that no donee of such a death benefit has a present
interest. Contingent beneficiaries may therefore present an ob-
stacle to qualifying the transfer of the death benefit as a pres-
ent interest for purposes of obtaining the annual exclusion.215
C. COMPLETED GI=T AT DEATH
The practical difficulties of prospective or periodic valua-
tion lead to the consideration of a third approach to the gift tax-
ation of pure death benefits-treat the gift as incomplete until
it becomes susceptible of valuation. Thus, the pure death bene-
fit would become a completed gift at the instant the employee
dies. Since the estate and gift taxes are now unified, on the
surface this approach seems to have the same tax effect as in-
cluding the benefit in the gross estate. Perhaps for this reason,
the Service recently adopted this theory in Revenue Ruling 81-
31.216
The death benefit involved in Revenue Ruling 81-31 was
paradigmatic of the type of plan held immune from estate taxa-
214. See Rev. Rul. 76-490, 1976-2 C.B. 300, which provides some indirect sup-
port for classifying the pure death benefit as a present interest. In that ruling,
an employee created an irrevocable trust and assigned to it all of his rights in a
group term life insurance policy provided by his employer. Under the terms of
the trust, the "beneficiary or the beneficiary's estate" was to receive the full
proceeds of the policy immediately upon the employee's death. Without ex-
plaining its rationale, the Service held that the premium payments by the em-
ployer, which were deemed to be gifts by the employee, were not gifts of a
future interest. The beneficiary's interest in such a trust is essentially the
same as an interest in an equivalent pure death benefit. A later ruling elabo-
rates that if the insurance proceeds are retained in the trust, the beneficiary
does not possess a present interest. Rev. Rul. 79-47, 1979-1 C.B. 312.
215. One commentator has suggested that an individual and his or her es-
tate are two separate entities and that Rev. Rul. 76-490, 1976-2 C.B. 300, dis-
cussed in note 214 supra, would therefore support the notion that secondary
beneficiaries pose no present interest problem. Crown, supra note 4, at 48.
This argument seems weak at best. The naming of the beneficiary's estate as a
secondary beneficiary does not create contingent beneficiaries in any meaning-
ful sense. The heirs, legatees, or devisees of the beneficiary would succeed to
the beneficiary's interest even if no such secondary beneficiary had been
named.
216. 1981-4 LR.B. 30.
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tion. An employee, D, entered into an employment contract
with D's employer corporation. In consideration of future serv-
ices to be rendered by D, the corporation agreed to pay a death
benefit to D's surviving spouse if D were employed by the cor-
poration at D's death. The death benefit was to be equal to
twice D's annual salary at the date of D's death. D had no right
to change the beneficiary, nor was any amount payable to D's
estate in the event D's spouse predeceased D. The benefit was
not funded in any manner and was created more than three
years before D's death. The Service concluded that D made a
transfer to D's surviving spouse that became a completed gift
for gift tax purposes in the calendar quarter in which D died,
"at which time the amount of the gift first became susceptible
of valuation." 217
Although this approach represents a reasonable response
to the failure of the courts to subject the pure death benefit to
estate taxation, it finds little support in the case law and im-
properly merges the two quite different concepts of valuation
and completion. Language in some cases certainly suggests
that the timing of the taxability of a gift may depend on when
its value becomes ascertainable,2 18 but these assertions are
dicta because the courts concluded that valuation was possi-
ble.219 Another court has stated forthrightly that the fact that
the value of a transferred interest is "speculative, uncertain
and contingent upon future developments" is 'Immaterial" to
the timing issue.22 0 Although the Supreme Court has never
dealt directly with the issue, it seems to have assumed that the
difficulty of valuing a remote property interest does not pre-
clude its taxation as a gift.2 2 1
Notwithstanding this authority, the Service supported its
217. Id. at 31. The Service has taken a similar open valuation approach in a
number of situations outside the employee death benefits area. See Rev. Rul.
79-384, 1979-2 C.B. 344; Rev. Rul. 75-71, 1975-1 C.B. 309; Rev. Rul. 69-347, 1969-1
C.B. 227; Rev. Rul 69-346, 1969-1 C.B. 227.
218. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505, 509 (2d Cir. 1953);
Harris v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds,
340 U.S. 106 (1950).
219. Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d at 509; Harris v. Commissioner,
178 F.2d at 865.
220. Gait v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 41, 50 (7th Cir. 1954).
221. See Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 180 (1943):
[T]he taxpayer contends that no realistic value can be placed on the
contingent remainder and that it therefore should not be classed as a
gift. ... We cannot accept any suggestion that the complexity of a
property interest created by a trust can serve to defeat a tax. ... The
language of the gift tax statute... is broad enough to include prop-
erty, however conceptual or contingent.
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conclusion in Revenue Ruling 81-31 by analogizing the pure
death benefit to the property arrangement involved in an ear-
lier ruling, Revenue Ruling 69-346.222 That ruling involved an
enforceable agreement between a husband and wife that stipu-
lated that if he made provisions for her comfort in a trust to be
created under his will, she would transfer her one-half interest
in their community property to the trust after his death. The
ruling concluded that at the time of the agreement it was not
determinable whether the wife had made a gift and, if so, of
what value.223 Applying the open valuation theory, the Service
concluded that the wife had not made a taxable gift until her
husband's death, because the gift could not be valued before
that event.224
The Service correctly observed that both the pure death
benefit in Revenue Ruling 81-31 and the wife's promise in Reve-
nue Ruling 69-346 had no readily ascertainable value when they
first became enforceable. There was, however, no need to
reach the valuation issue, because in both situations the donor
retained sufficient dominion and control to render the transfer
incomplete for gift tax purposes. The wife could determine the
extent of her community property by manipulating her invest-
ments and expenditures. Similarly, the employee in the pure
death benefit case could destroy the beneficiary's interest by
terminating his or her employment or by agreeing with the em-
ployer to terminate the benefit.
The crucial distinction the Service missed between the
facts of Revenue Ruling 69-346 and the pure death benefit is
that in the former the donor is still alive when the gift becomes
complete. Although a completed lifetime transfer of a property
interest certainly comes within the scope of the gift tax, a
transfer which becomes complete by reason of the death of the
donor seems beyond its reach. The gift tax regulations, more-
over, concede this point. Section 25.2511-2(f)225 of the regula-
tions regards "[t] he relinquishment or termination of a power
to change the beneficiaries of transferred property, occurring
otherwise than by the death of the donor (the statute being con-
fined to transfers by living donors),. . . as the event that com-
pletes the gift and causes the tax to apply."226 The Service, in
Revenue Ruling 81-31, has created a highly artificial distinction
222. 1969-1 CB. 227.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f) (1958).
226. Id. (emphasis added).
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between two forms of incomplete gifts. In the Service's view, a
gift that becomes complete at the donor's death, because the
donor's retained powers have terminated, is not subject to the
gift tax, but a gift that becomes complete at the donor's death,
because it can then for the first time be valued, is taxable.
Nothing in the gift tax statute supports such a distinction.22 7
Whether the open valuation concept in general is an appro-
priate part of the gift tax law is a complex issue well beyond
the scope of this Article.228 The question of its applicability to
the pure death benefit would be irrelevant were such benefits
subject to the estate tax. But because current judicial thinking
incorrectly places such benefits beyond the reach of the estate
tax,229 Revenue Ruling 81-31 represents an expedient solution
to a striking deficiency in the current tax system. If upheld by
the courts, it would largely eliminate a significant loophole that
now allows taxpayers to transfer substantial amounts of wealth
free of any estate or gift tax.
Revenue Ruling 81-31 does not, however, produce transfer
tax consequences identical to those obtained by the inclusion
of the benefit in the deceased employee's gross estate. For ex-
ample, the Service conceded that such gifts represent transfers
of a present interest, and thus qualify for the $10,000 annual ex-
clusion.23 0 Therefore, unlike the result under the estate tax, if
the first $10,000 of every death benefit is characterized as a gift,
it will escape transfer taxation.
Subjecting the pure death benefit to gift taxation, rather
than estate taxation, will affect the operation of numerous stat-
utory provisions which depend on a determination of a dece-
dent's gross or taxable estate.231 For example, under section
6166232 an executor may elect to defer for up to five years the
payment of the estate tax attributable to a closely held busi-
ness, and thereafter pay the tax in up to ten annual install-
227. Under I.R.C. § 2501(a) (1), the gift tax is imposed "on the transfer of
property by gift."
228. For a particularly thoughtful and lucid discussion of the open valuation
problem, see Macris, Open Valuation and the Completed Transfer: A Problem
Area in Federal Gift Taxation, 34 TAx L. REv. 273 (1979).
229. See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
230. Rev. Rul. 81-31, 1981-4 LR. 30.
231. These include, among others, LR.C. § 303 (distribution in redemption of
stock to pay death taxes), LR.C. § 2032A (special valuation of qualified real
property), § 6166 (extension of time for payment of estate tax where estate con-
sists largely of an interest in a closely held business), and § 6501(e) (2) (statute
of limitations on assessment of estate tax).
232. I.R.C. § 6166, as amended by 1981 Act, Pub. L No. 97-34, § 422(a) (1), 95
Stat. 172.
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ments.233 To qualify for this deferral, the value of the closely
held business must exceed thirty-five percent of the adjusted
gross estate. By treating the death benefit as a gift, the gross
estate is reduced, and the estate more easily qualifies for the
special benefit of section 6166.
In addition, gift taxation under Revenue Ruling 81-31 cre-
ates a number of administrative irritations for the executor,
who in some situations must prepare and file a timely gift tax
return and pay the gift tax on a date much earlier than the due
date for the estate tax.234 The source of funds used for pay-
ment of the tax may also depend on whether the tax is a gift or
an estate tax. Many states have adopted apportionment stat-
utes that, in the absence of a contrary manifestation of intent,
require payment of the death taxes out of the various assets in
proportion to the death taxes generated by such assets.235 Be-
cause these statutes probably do not apply to gift taxes, the re-
siduary beneficiary might bear a disproportionate share of the
transfer taxes in relation to the recipient of the pure death
benefit.
Revenue Ruling 81-31 may also produce unwarranted in-
come tax effects. Whether the death benefit is treated as a tax-
able gift or included in the gross estate, for income tax
purposes the first $5,000 is tax free under section 101(b)236 and
the remainder is includable in the gross income of the benefici-
ary as income in respect of a decedent (IRD) within the mean-
ing of section 691(a).237 Although the recipient of IRD is
generally entitled to an income tax deduction for the amount of
the estate tax attributable to the IRD,238 if the death benefit is
treated as a gift, it is not included in the gross estate and the
IRD deduction is lost.239 If the death benefit is large enough to
233. Id.
234. See LR.C. § 6075, as amended by 1981 Act, Pub. L No. 97-34, § 442(d) (3),
95 Stat. 172. The need for an earlier filing of the gift tax return would arise if
the death occurred after July 15 of any year.
235. See, e.g., CAT_ PROB. CODE § 970 (Deering 1974).
236. LR.C. § 101(b).
237. I.R.C. § 691(a). See Estate of Nilssen v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 260
(D. Minn. 1971); Rev. RuL 73-327, 1973-2 C.B. 214. See also Rev. RuL 65-217, 1965-
2 C.B. 214 (employee bonus paid after death is income in respect of a decedent
even though no enforceable right existed at time of death and the benefit was
not included in decedent's gross estate).
238. I.R.C. § 691(c).
239. For example, assume the employee dies in 1982 with a $200,000 death
benefit payable to a child and a taxable estate of $1,000,000. Under Rev. Rul. 81-
31, 1981-4 I.R.. 30, the death benefit would produce a taxable gift of $190,000,
after allowance for the annual exclusion. See LR.C. § 2503(b). Assuming the
deceased employee had made no prior taxable gifts, no gift tax would be paya-
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actually generate the payment of gift taxes, the gift taxes would
in effect be deductible by the beneficiary for income tax pur-
poses since the death benefit would have a basis in the hands
of the beneficiary equal to the gift taxes paid.240 This deduc-
tion, however, will generally be less than the IRD deduction
that would be available if the death benefit were included in
the gross estate. No tax policy justifies such difference in treat-
ment; the double taxation problem underlying the enactment of
the IRD deduction 241 is present whether the benefit is taxed as
a gift or as a part of the gross estate.
In summary, Revenue Ruling 81-31 is not the proper solu-
tion to the pure death benefit problem. It is an inappropriate
application of the gift tax to a transfer that, because of its in-
herently testamentary nature, is more naturally the object of
the estate tax.
IV. STATUTORY REFORM
The pure death benefit is undoubtedly a proper subject of
wealth transfer taxation. The payment to the beneficiary is
wealth generated by the decedent's labor, which in principle is
no different than the wealth created by the decedent's wages in
the form of savings and investments. Although there is no di-
rect cash purchase, the benefit is furnished in exchange for the
services of the employee. Whether the employee can select or
alter the beneficiaries of the death benefit is not relevant to the
issue of whether the employee has made a transfer; the benefit
is part of the employee's compensation package, and since it
derives solely from the services of the employee, it is appropri-
ble by reason of the unified credit. See LR.C. § 2505, as amended by 1981 Act,
Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 401(b), 95 Stat. 172. The estate tax would be computed on
$1,190,000, the sum of the taxable estate plus taxable gifts, which results in a
tax of $360,900. See LR.C. § 2001(b).
If the death benefit were included in the gross estate, the estate tax would
be computed on $1,200,000, which results in a tax of $365,000. The estate tax is
essentially the same; the small difference is attributable to the effect of the
$10,000 annual exclusion. The real difference is with respect to the RD deduc-
tion. The estate tax attributable to the IRD is the excess of the estate tax over
the estate tax computed without including the IRD in the gross estate. In this
example, the IRD is $195,000 because of the $5,000 exclusion under LR.C.
§ 101(b). The estate tax attributable to the IRD is therefore $365,000 less
$285,050 (the estate tax on a taxable estate of $1,005,000), or $79,950. Thus, when
the $200,000 benefit is paid, the child will have gross income of $195,000, but with
an offsetting deduction of $79,950. The child would lose this rather significant
deduction if the death benefit were treated as a gift.
240. LR.C. § 1015(d).
241. See generally M. FERGUSON, J. FREELAND, & R STEPHENS, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND BENEFICIARIS 284-85 (1970).
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ate to treat the employee as the transferor.242
Having concluded that there is a transfer, one must deter-
mine the appropriate time to tax it. If a beneficiary's enjoy-
ment of the property remains subject to the control of the
transferor, the propertr should be taxed upon death as part of
the estate since the transfer is inherently testamentary. Even
if an employee had no express control over the death benefit,
the beneficiaries do not receive anything of substantial value
prior to the employee's death that would warrant the imposi-
tion of only a gift tax. Although the pure death benefit with an
irrevocably named beneficiary is theoretically subject to the
gift tax, either at its creation or continuously over its existence,
gift tax valuation alone is an inadequate measure of the value
of the transfer. Not only is the valuation problem extremely
difficult, but the employee's ability to terminate the benefit by
ceasing employment represents an inherent control over the
benefit that justifies the treatment of any transfer as incom-
plete until death.
This Article has suggested that the courts could properly
interpret section 2038 to include the pure death benefit in a de-
ceased employee's gross estate.243 Their failure to do so em-
phasizes the need for statutory reform. The simplest solution
would be the amendment of section 2039(a) to remove the re-
tained interest requirement. 244 Although such an amendment
would include any contractual pure death benefit in the em-
ployee's gross estate, the includability of unenforceable bene-
fits-benefits which remain discretionary with the employer
even after the death of the employee-would remain un-
resolved. Although the regulations to section 2039(a) indicate
that such discretionary plans may be includable in the gross
estate,2 45 the courts have divided over this issue.246 In amend-
242. See notes 89-92 supra and accompany text.
243. See notes 168-80 supra and accompanying text.
244. Substantially similar proposals have frequently been made. See A",
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFt TAXATION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTER'S STUD-
IEs 44, 46 (1969); G. COOPER, A VOLUNTARY TAX? 97 (1979); Dodge, Substantial
Oumership and Substance Versus Form: Proposals for the Unification of Fed-
eral Estate and Gift Taxes and for the Taxation of Generation-Skipping Trans-
fers, 1976 U. ILL. L F. 657, 701-02; Kramer, supra note 3, at 389.
245. In order to reach a death benefit under section 2039, the benefit must
be receivable under "any form of contract or agreement." Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-
1(b) (1) (1958). The Regulations interpret this term to include "any arrange-
ment, understanding or plan," id., and provide an example that holds that a
consistent practice by the employer of paying benefits is sufficient. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2039-1(b) (2), ex. 4 (1958).
246. Compare Estate of Barr v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 227, 237 (1963), acq. in
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ing section 2039(a), therefore, Congress should specify that the
discretionary nature of the death benefit does not preclude its
inclusion in the employee's gross estate.247
The inclusion of unenforceable benefits in the gross estate,
however, raises a potentially serious valuation problem. An en-
forceable promise by an employer to pay $1,000 per month for
three years is certainly worth something more than a similar
result only, 1978-1 C.B. 1 (not includable) with Neely v. United States, 613 F.2d
802, 808 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (includable). In Barr, the Tax Court stated that Congress
intended that the requirement of a "contract or agreement" meant an enforcea-
ble arrangement; the mere consistency of payment was insufficient. 40 T.C. at
235-36. Neely, however, refused to limit section 2039(a) to enforceable agree-
ments. 613 F.2d at 808. Neely justifiably criticized the statements of the Barr
court as mere dictum, since the employer involved in fact had not always paid
death benefits. Id. at 807 n.13.
Barr and Neely involved two common, but dramatically different, factual
situations. In Barr, the decedent was employed by a publicly held corporation
in which he had no significant interest. The lack of enforceability of the death
benefit was largely irrelevant because the economic self-interest of the em-
ployer would compel the payment, barring unusual circumstances. In Neely,
the decedent owned 51 percent of the stock of the employer, his wife owned 20
percent, and the remainder was owned by their two daughters and their
spouses. The death benefit was payable to the wife. As the court in Neely put
it, "any requirement of enforceability here would be an empty formality." 613
F.2d at 807. Given the control by the beneficiary and her familial relationship to
the other shareholders, the possibility that the benefit would not be paid, other
than through a voluntary renunciation, was remote.
It might be argued that the death benefit in Neely was not a transfer by the
decedent, but instead was an indirect transfer by the other family members to
the widow. Long-standing Treasury regulations provide that a transfer by a
corporation of money or assets to a stockholder in exchange for less than ade-
quate and full consideration is a gift from the other stockholders to the extent
the transfer exceeds the donee's own interest in such transfer. Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2511-1(h) (1) (1958). But it is also well established that a "transfer of prop-
erty made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide,
at arm's length, and free from any donative intent)" does not constitute a gift.
Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945); see Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8
(1958). Thus, although the death benefit is unenforceable, if it would be a rea-
sonable business practice to pay it, the payment will be considered to be made
for adequate and full consideration. A significant issue might still be whether
the payment would have been made absent the family relationship. If the
death benefit was just another component of the fringe benefit package pro-
vided to the employee by the employer, and the package was appropriate, given
the nature of the business and the employee's position in the company, the
payment to the beneficiary will probably not be treated as a gift. Under the
facts in Barr, the payment of the death benefit would certainly not be consid-
ered to be a gift by the thousands of shareholders of the employer.
247. An employer who sets up a technically discretionary plan will likely
adhere to its terms. An employer simply cannot afford to disrupt the expecta-
tions of the highly compensated executives who are the typical recipients of
pure death benefit plans. See notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text. Given
the sophistication of such employees and the care with which their benefit
packages are fashioned, one suspects that in many instances the benefit has
been made discretionary precisely to avoid federal estate taxation.
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unenforceable promise. Nonetheless, if the employer has con-
sistently paid the benefits, 248 the value of the possible future
payment is clearly greater than zero, since a willing buyer249
would pay something to a willing seller for the right to receive
any payments which are actually made. A reasonable approach
toward the valuation of such benefits would be to compute the
value of the benefit assuming it were enforceable, then dis-
count that amount by the probability of nonpayment.250 The
contingent nature of an unenforceable employee death benefit
is not a justification for excluding it from the reach of the estate
tax, since the need to value contingent interests is an unfortu-
nate but frequent feature of the present estate tax system.25 '
As a corollary to subjecting the pure death benefit to estate
taxation, Congress should treat the irrevocable designation of a
beneficiary and the continued existence of the pure death ben-
efit as an incomplete gift for gift tax purposes. Although the
beneficiary has received a current economic benefit of non-zero
value, its precise value is indeterminate, and as a practical mat-
ter the beneficiary could not sell the right to the benefit.252 The
benefit is also not a direct substitute for an expense the benefi-
ciary would otherwise reasonably have incurred, such as con-
ventional insurance coverage, since the benefit is terminable if
248. See, e.g., Estate of Salt v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 92, 97 (1951) (death
benefits paid to all qualified beneficiaries for fifteen year period according to
the plan).
249. The accepted definition of "value" for estate tax purposes is the "price
at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a will-
ing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958).
250. In some cases, the death benefit will be paid before the estate tax is
due. For example, in Estate of Salt v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 92 (1951), the pay-
ments under one of the plans involved were completed within two months of
the employee's death. Id. at 97. The amount of the payment is not determina-
tive of the valuation question; the courts have consistently held that contingent
claims are to be valued at the applicable valuation date, without regard to what
is ultimately received. See, e.g., Duffield v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 944, 947
(ED. Pa. 1955); Mullikin v. Magruder, 55 F. Supp. 895, 903 (D. Md. 1944), aff'd on
other grounds, 149 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1945); Estate of Curry v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 540, 551 (1980). Cf. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 594
F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1979) (value of contested life insurance claim is the value of
the claim at the date of death, and not the amount of the claim ultimately
recovered).
251. This particular problem would be eliminated under an accessions tax
system. See generally Andrew, The Accession Tax Proposal, 22 TAx L REv. 589
(1967). In many ways, the accessions tax is more consistent with the equitable
principles underlying both income and wealth transfer taxation. See Steuerle,
Equity and the Taxation of Wealth Transfers, OTA Paper 39, U.S. Treas. Dep't,
June 1980.
252. See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
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the employee leaves employment or if the benefit is renegoti-
ated.25 3 There is therefore little risk that estate taxation alone
will undervalue the total effective wealth transfer.254
This statutory scheme, however, results in a transfer tax
treatment of pure death benefits diametrically opposite to the
treatment of employer-provided life insurance. If the employee
assigns the policy, the employer's premium payments are
treated as gifts by the employee to the assignee,2 55 and the pro-
ceeds are not includable in the employee's gross estate.256
Such profound differences in treatment are difficult to justify,
given the essential functional and economic similarities be-
tween the two benefits.25 7 Congress should therefore subject
the assigned group term life insurance policy to estate taxa-
tion.258 This result could be achieved by amending Section 2042
to provide that any incidents of ownership held by an employer
in a policy of life insurance259 on an employee will be attrib-
uted to the employee, unless the policy is payable to the em-
253. See note 156 supra and accompanying text.
254. To see the possibility of undervaluation, assume that the beneficiary is
entitled to a $200,000 death benefit if the employee dies, and that the benefici-
ary is able to sell his or her rights to a speculator for $1,000 per year. If the
employee works for ten years and then moves to another employer, the benefi-
ciary has been enriched by $10,000. Yet nothing would be included in the de-
ceased employee's gross estate since the benefit no longer existed.
255. See note 199 supra and accompanying text.
256. See notes 133-35 supra and accompanying text.
257. See notes 109-10 supra and accompanying text. In support of the pres-
ent treatment of life insurance, one could point to the ability of the assignee in
most cases to continue the life insurance coverage, albeit in a different form,
even if the employee terminates employment. Yet the fact remains that the
employer controls the existence of the policy; it is a renegotiable part of the
employee benefit package. So long as the insurance benefit remains linked to
the decedent's compensation scheme, it is legitimate to view the transfer of the
policy as incomplete for estate tax purposes.
258. Apart from its theoretical propriety, subjecting the assigned group
term life insurance policy to estate taxation would protect the transfer tax base
from significant erosion due to the underreporting of the taxable gifts con-
nected with the employer's premium payments. The practical difficulties of au-
diting the large number of relatively small periodic transfers are extreme,
especially given the existence of the $10,000 annual exclusion, and there is un-
doubtedly significant leakage. Unless the annual premium payments exceeded
$10,000, one cannot easily determine whether the decedent had any obligation
to file a gift tax return. The Service would have to inquire into the existence of
other gifts to the assignee, such as birthday presents, vacations, and the like, in
order to ascertain whether the $10,000 limit had been exceeded.
259. Although this Article has focused on group term insurance, the amend-
ments should also apply to the more esoteric employer provided insurance ve-
hicles, such as split-dollar insurance, retired lives reserve insurance, and group
permanent insurance, which are also widely regarded as transfer tax avoidance
devices.
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ployer or is otherwise not intended to be compensation. 60 In
addition, a provision should be added to the gift tax statute that
would exempt the premium payments from treatment as a
transfer for gift tax purposes. As in the case of the employee
death benefit, there is little risk of transfer tax avoidance.6 1
V. CONCLUSION
The judicial treatment of the pure death benefit under the
estate tax has been inadequate. Contrary to the decided cases,
the typical pure death benefit is properly includable in a de-
ceased employee's gross estate under quite reasonable inter-
pretations of the Code and its underlying policy. Recognizing
that the current law has created a significant loophole, the
Service has recently attempted to circumvent these decisions
by ruling that the pure death benefit is subject to the gift tax
when the employee dies. The doctrinal support for this ap-
proach is weak, and the use of the gift tax in this manner is in-
appropriate. Whether the courts will sustain the Service's
position is therefore quite uncertain. Some support exists for
treating the pure death benefit as a continuous series of gifts
analogous to the gift of premiums on group life insurance, but
difficult questions arise regarding the appropriate valuation.
Since the Supreme Court has never ruled on the estate or
gift taxation of pure death benefits, it may be possible to per-
suade the courts, along the lines advanced in this Article, that
the estate tax does indeed reach the pure death benefit. If this
is unsuccessful, section 2039 should be amended to eliminate
the lifetime benefit requirement. This amendment would effec-
tively include the pure death benefit in a deceased employee's
gross estate.
260. This latter limitation would cover situations in which an employer
takes out life insurance on a key employee and makes the employer's spouse
the beneficiary. There is no compensatory purpose and it would be inappropri-
ate to treat the payment of the proceeds as a testamentary transfer by the
employee.
261. See note 254 supra and accompanying text.
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